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Do Firms Really Allocate Capital So Inefficiently? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The capital allocation process is a critical component of strategic execution for multidivisional 
firms. Despite this importance, strategy scholars have ceded much of the empirical work in 
capital allocation efficiency to the domains of finance and economics. The bulk of this research, 
as well as evidence from prominent field studies in strategic management, concludes that 
managers make significantly inefficient capital allocation decisions—a result that should be of 
concern to business managers and strategy scholars alike. This paper asks whether managers are 
truly allocating capital so inefficiently, or do they instead have a valid strategic rationale that 
explains their investment decisions. Building off the general framework of internal capital 
market efficiency from financial economics, this paper develops a new measure of strategic 
capital allocation. The new approach introduces a multidimensional measure to capture the 
strategic trade-offs between future growth and current profitability, which are faced by managers 
during the complex resource allocation process. In the first stage of the empirical analysis, 
managers are found to be allocating capital more than twice as efficiently than prior literature 
suggests. The second stage validates this multidimensional approach by demonstrating the 
predicted theoretical relationship between a strategic measure of capital allocation and firm-level 
value, namely, that managers appear to be capable of enhancing performance through strategic 
capital allocation. 
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1     INTRODUCTION 
 
 The capital allocation process is a critical component of strategic execution. Through the 
efficient allocation of internal capital resources, top-level managers of the multidivisional firm 
should be able to enhance firm-level performance (Chandler 1962; Williamson 1975; Stein 
1997). Long-term competitive advantage requires them to develop unique combinations of 
resources through a strategic capital allocation process (Rumelt 1984; Wernerfelt 1984; Dierickx 
and Cool 1989). However, the central conclusions from prominent field research (Christensen 
and Bower 1996; Sull 1999), as well as the bulk of empirical results (Lamont 1997; Shin and 
Stulz 1998; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003; Gopalan, Nanda, and 
Seru 2007; Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010), suggest that the internal allocation of capital is 
significantly inefficient. While some instances of empirical work do find that multidivisional 
firms allocate capital efficiently (Khanna and Tice 2001; Maksimovic and Phillips 1998), the 
prevailing conclusion (Stein 2003) is that agency costs distort the resource allocation process 
within internal capital markets (Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Rajan et al. 2000). In the strategic 
management literature, recent research by Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo (2011) also concludes that 
firms are inefficiently allocating capital among their business units, primarily due to naïve 
behavioral biases (Bromiley 1986; Barney and Zajac 1994; Gilbert 2001; Garbuio, King, and 
Lovallo 2011). 
 Given the critical link between resource allocation and strategy, the high and persistent 
levels of inefficient capital allocation documented in the literature should be of concern to 
business managers and strategy scholars alike. A concrete example from Billett and Mauer 
(2003) highlights the concern: the authors find that multidivisional firms efficiently allocate 
capital among only 25% of their operating segments; i.e., firms appear to be destroying value 
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through inefficient capital allocation decisions as much as 75% of the time. This paper asks 
whether managers are truly allocating capital so inefficiently, or do they instead have a valid 
strategic rationale that explains their investment decisions. As suggested by the bulk of evidence 
cited above, strategy scholars have ceded much of the empirical work in capital allocation 
efficiency to the domains of finance and economics.1 The interdisciplinary approach in this paper 
thus extends the general framework of internal capital market efficiency from financial 
economics (Berger and Ofek 1995; Rajan et al. 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003) to provide new 
insights into what I define as strategic capital allocation. 
 In the first stage of the empirical analysis I evaluate the efficiency of internal capital 
markets from a strategic perspective and compare it to the traditional approach from the extant 
literature. In contrast to prior work that relies on uni-dimensional measures (see Sections 2 and 3 
for more detail), I develop a multidimensional measure of capital allocation efficiency to capture 
the strategic trade-offs between current profitability and future growth (Marris 1963; Marris 
1964; Williamson 1964), which are faced by managers during the complex process of resource 
allocation (Bower 1970; Burgelman 1983). As previously noted, research by Billett and Mauer 
(2003) finds that firms are allocating capital efficiently among only 25% of their segments, and I 
replicate those results within a longer sample period from 1979 to 2009. Then, using the 
multidimensional measure of strategic capital allocation proposed in this paper, I find that firms 
are efficiently allocating capital 53% of the time, more than twice as often than prior literature 
suggests. 
 The validity of any new measure depends on its ability to systematically predict the 
expected relationships of the underlying theory (Venkatraman and Grant 1986), therefore the 
                                                 
1 An exception in the strategy literature is the work by Bardolet et al. (2011). In the introduction to their empirical 
analysis, the authors remark, “Given the important role capital allocation plays in business strategy, it is surprising 
that this topic has received relatively little attention in the empirical strategy literature” (Bardolet et al. 2011, 1455). 
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second stage of the analysis attempts to validate the new, multidimensional measure of strategic 
capital allocation.2 If the measure truly captures the strategic trade-offs faced by managers during 
the complex resource allocation process, these capital allocation decisions should enhance firm 
value. To validate this expected theoretical relationship, I calculate the value-added from internal 
capital market allocations (Rajan et al. 2000; Peyer 2002; Billett and Mauer 2003) and test its 
association with proxies of firm-level performance. Consistent with extant literature, value-added 
based on the uni-dimensional measure of internal capital market efficiency shows an 
insignificant (and sometimes negative) association with performance.3 On the other hand, value-
added from the strategic measure of capital allocation shows a positive and significant 
association in all tests, and the results are robust for up to five years following the resource 
allocation decision. These results validate the new, multidimensional measure of capital 
allocation efficiency—firms appear to be capable of enhancing performance through strategic 
capital allocation. 
 This paper makes two important contributions. First, the paper investigates a fundamental 
component of strategic management theory and practice—the efficiency of a firm’s internal 
capital allocation processes—that has been largely neglected by strategy scholars of late. The 
internal capital market of the firm is a fundamental component strategic performance. The 
                                                 
2 In this context, Peter (1979) defines validity as “the degree to which instruments truly measure the constructs they 
are intended to measure.” Construct validity tests, for example, have traditionally been carried out in the strategy 
literature for firm-level diversification measures (Lubatkin, Merchant, and Srinivasan 1993) and more recently for 
business unit-level relatedness measures (Bryce and Winter 2009).  
3 The insignificant and negative associations are consistent with prior work showing a diversification discount for 
multidivisional firms (Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Servaes 1996). While this literature has been 
criticized for selection and measurement biases (Whited 2001; Campa and Kedia 2002; Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf 
2002; Villalonga 2004; Chevalier 2004), research designs that examine the diversification discount both before and 
after the divestment decisions of multidivisional firms attempt to mitigate these biases (Gertner, Powers, and 
Scharfstein 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani 2003; Burch and Nanda 2003; Ahn and Denis 2004). My research avoids 
this debate because it is not focused on the diversification discount, but on the internal allocation of capital within 
diversified firms. I am only comparing the efficiency of individual segments within each firm, not the efficiency (or 
market value, as in the diversification discount) between multidivisional and focused firms. The two strands of 
research are naturally related in that an inefficient internal capital market is often cited as an explanation for the 
diversification discount.  
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second contribution is of paramount importance for the practice of strategy: the results in this 
paper provide insight for managers on how to create value through strategic capital allocation. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
internal capital allocation efficiency in the strategic management and financial economics 
literatures, while Section 3 builds on this review to develop a new measure of strategic capital 
allocation. In Section 4 I describe the empirical methods, sample definition, and the construction 
of key variables for the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 
concludes. I also include a discussion of limitations and the significant contributions of this 
paper in the final section. 
 
2     BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 A fundamental development of the M-form organization during the 1920s, as first 
chronicled by Chandler (1962) at DuPont, General Motors, and Standard Oil, is the introduction 
of a top-level executive committee responsible for the firm’s long-term capital allocation 
decisions. These capital allocation decisions are conducted within an “internal capital market,” 
where business-unit managers compete for the scarce resources of the firm (Williamson 1970). 
For the multidivisional firm, an internal capital market provides a significant amount of the 
resources available for the execution of its strategic objectives. A recent empirical investigation 
by McKinsey & Company, for example, estimates that “the amount of capital allocated or 
reallocated” within internal capital markets is more than the amount of external funding from 
equity and debt combined (Hall, Lovallo, and Musters 2012). 
 Research in strategic management has long recognized that the capital allocation process 
is a critical component of strategic execution. Chandler (1962, 16) goes so far as to define 
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strategy in terms of the resource allocation process: “Strategy can be defined as the 
determination of the basic long-term goals” of the firm, as well as “the allocation of resources 
necessary for carrying out these goals.” Similarly, Williamson (1975) analyzes the important 
functions of internal capital markets and argues that “the assignment of cash flows to high-yield 
uses is the most fundamental attribute” of multidivisional firms. In his seminal field research on 
the resource allocation process, Bower (1970) concludes in part that resource allocation drives 
strategy.4 The link between strategy and capital allocation is particularly important from a 
resource-based view of the firm. Lippman and Rumelt (2003) describe strategy as “the problem 
of discovering or estimating the value of various resource combinations.” Earlier, Rumelt (1984) 
postulates an entrepreneurial theory of strategy where firms make resource allocation decisions 
in an attempt to create competitive advantage. He concludes that the decision of where to 
compete by investing scarce resources is one of “the most critical strategic choices” faced by 
firms. 
 Despite the importance of the resource allocation process to strategic management (both 
in theory and in practice), much of the research on capital allocation efficiency has been carried 
out by scholars in finance and economics. The remainder of this section describes this work in 
more detail. First, I outline the theoretical perspectives of efficiency within an internal capital 
market; then I introduce prominent field studies and empirical results from strategy and financial 
economics, both of which overwhelmingly conclude that the capital allocation process is 
inefficient. 
  
                                                 
4 In their review of the strategic resource allocation literature, Bower, Doz, and Gilbert (2005, 12) summarize this 
point succinctly: “How resources are actually allocated and used determines strategic outcomes—not the words on 
paper or policies.” In the same volume, Gilbert and Christensen (2005, 84) describe the resource allocation process 
as being “inseparably connected to strategy.” 
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Theoretical Background of Capital Market Efficiency 
 Williamson (1970; 1975) first introduces the theoretical argument that the internal capital 
allocation process can be value-enhancing for the multidivisional firm. In a world of limited 
contracting and bounded rationality, the ability of top management to allocate resources among 
divisions may limit the opportunism of divisional managers. Rather than automatically 
reinvesting free cash flow at the division level, profitable business units must return excess cash 
to the top-level managers of the firm. This “miniature” capital market within the firm can 
enhance allocation efficiency by subjecting all free cash flow to an “internal competition” among 
the business units (Williamson 1970; 1975). Work by Gertner at al. (1994) argues that top-level 
management in the multidivisional firm maintains a unique “control right,” giving it unilateral 
decision-making over the reallocation of capital toward better-performing divisions.5 Stein 
(1997) further develops a theoretical model where management utilizes this control right to 
engage in “winner picking,” efficiently reallocating capital from the firm’s “losing” projects to 
the “winners.” 
 A different theoretical perspective, however, has dominated much of the extant literature. 
Agency costs, both at the level of top management and internally among divisions, can distort 
the capital allocation process and lead to inefficient investments.6 Scharfstein and Stein (2000) 
develop a model where managers of relatively worse performing divisions exhibit “rent-seeking” 
behavior (Milgrom and Roberts 1990) in order to accumulate more compensation than their 
skills are objectively worth. Instead of compensating these managers with cash, top management 
distorts the internal capital market by rewarding them with additional capital subsidies from the 
                                                 
5 The idea of a “control right” is first introduced by Grossman and Hart (1986). 
6 A working paper by Alok and Gopalan (2012) uses a unique dataset to examine how the compensation structures 
of business unit managers in multidivisional firms may act to mitigate these agency conflicts. Wulf (2002) finds that 
the compensation incentives and investment decisions of division-level managers are substitutes.  
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firm’s relatively better performing businesses. Similarly, Rajan et al. (2000) describe how power 
struggles between divisions with heterogeneous investment opportunities can lead to an 
inefficient capital market within the firm. In their theoretical model, managers are more 
interested in developing the profitability of their divisions than the overall profitability of the 
firm, which drives top management to cross-subsidize the weaker performing divisions. 
 Bromiley (1986) and Barney and Zajac (1994) highlight the importance of behavioral 
phenomena on the resource allocation decisions of top management. The field work by Gilbert 
(2001) within the newspaper industry provides a compelling example. He shows that prospect 
theory and risk framing (Kahneman and Tversky 1984) can influence the cognitive architecture 
underlying the capital allocation process. Recent research by Garbuio et al. (2011) also applies 
constructs from psychology and behavioral science to explore how the capital allocation process 
is influenced by managerial heuristics and biases. The authors consider the possibility of adverse 
effects related to resource endowments, familiarity, extremeness aversion, anchoring, and 
partition dependence. Although Garbuio et al. (2011) allow that capital allocation based on 
heuristics might also be efficient, their propositions provide a summary outline of how 
managerial biases can result in suboptimal allocation decisions for the firm.  
 
Field Research and Empirical Evidence of Inefficient Capital Markets 
 While the bulk of empirical evidence on capital allocation efficiency is rooted in the 
financial economics literature, I also highlight two prominent field studies that illustrate the 
resource allocation process from the perspective of strategic management.7 Christensen and 
                                                 
7 In addition to the works of Christensen and Bower (1996) and Sull (1999), which are detailed here, other scholars 
that have examined inefficiencies within in the resource allocation process include Eisenman and Bower (2000) in 
the cable industry, Noda and Bower (1996) in the regional telecom industry, and Kuemmerle (1999) in international 
expansion decisions.  
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Bower (1996) show that industry leaders failed to invest in new, strategically important products 
(i.e., the 5.25-inch hard-disk-drives for desktop personal computers in the early 1980s) that did 
not match the firms’ current strategic context (which was focused on 8-inch drives for 
minicomputers). These once-leading firms tended to fail. In another example, Sull (1999) finds 
that top management at Firestone Tire & Rubber failed to make strong investments into new 
technologies (i.e., radial tires first developed by Michelin) during the 1960s and 1970s, in part 
due to Firestone’s outdated strategic context (which was focused on bias tire technology). 
Firestone went on to lose a significant amount of market value before eventually being acquired.8 
In both field studies, top management recognized the threat from new and growing markets early 
in the investment process, but they continued to allocate capital to their still profitable 
businesses.9 
 Empirically, two examples of efficient internal capital markets come from Khanna and 
Tice (2001) in the retail industry and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) in the manufacturing 
industry. Khanna and Tice (2001) examine the exogenous shock of WalMart’s entry into new 
markets. They find that multidivisional firms with related divisions allocate less cash flow to 
their divisions with declining productivity, i.e., those competing against WalMart in its new 
markets. The results suggest that these retail firms operate an efficient internal capital market 
when facing external, competitive pressure. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) use U.S. Census 
data to show that manufacturing firms appear to allocate capital efficiently at the plant level. 
                                                 
8 The field research on Firestone (Sull 1999) is also an example of inefficient divestment, an area where strategy 
researchers have made interesting contributions to the analysis of resource allocation decisions (Duhaime and Grant 
1984; Duhaime and Schwenk 1985; Shimizu and Hitt 2005; Shimizu 2007). For example, Elfenbein and Knott 
(2011) show that 85% of business exits occur later than what would be rationally predicted in an option-value 
model. 
9 In fact, the leading firms in the hard-disk-drive industry were the first to develop many of the new technologies, 
but they then failed to adjust their strategic context away from currently profitable product lines (Christensen and 
Bower 1996). 
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Investment in a productive plant increases after a positive demand shock in its own industry, as 
well as after a negative demand shock in other the industries where the firm operates.  
 These two, industry-specific studies notwithstanding, the preponderance of empirical 
evidence suggests that firms are not allocating their internal capital resources efficiently. Using 
the international oil crisis in 1986 as an exogenous shock, Lamont (1997) presents evidence that 
multidivisional oil firms were inefficiently subsidizing their divisions in unrelated, non-oil 
industries. Post-shock, the oil firms decreased these non-oil investments, even though the 
investment outlook of those industries was not affected by the shock and other firms in those 
industries did not decrease their investment levels. Shin and Stulz (1998) use a large-sample 
empirical test to find similar results. They show that a segment’s association with the cash flow 
of other segments does not depend on whether the segment has the best investment opportunities 
within the firm. In an efficient internal capital market, we would expect that segments with better 
investment opportunities have priority in the allocation of capital, not that segments appear to be 
treated equally, as the evidence in Shin and Stulz (1998) suggests. 
 After they develop their theoretical model of rent-seeking divisions within the firm, 
Rajan et al. (2000) empirically demonstrate this inefficiency. They show that segments with 
relatively high investment opportunities make cash flow transfers and, conversely, that segments 
with relatively low investment opportunities receive cash flow subsidies. Billett and Mauer 
(2003) examine these cash flow transfers and subsidies directly, using cash flow and investment 
data at the segment level. They find that only 25% of segment-level investments are efficient. 
Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007), in their study of Indian conglomerates, also examine cash 
flows directly at the level of the business group and demonstrate that excess cash tends to flow 
11 
toward underperforming groups.10 Even after receiving this internal funding, the subsidized 
business groups continue to exhibit lower performance, suggesting the excess cash was not used 
on profitable investment opportunities. 
 Using carefully matched segments, Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) show that 
multidivisional firms tend to invest less than their standalone peers in industries with relatively 
high investment opportunities and more than those peers in industries with relatively low 
investment opportunities.11 By looking at allocation decisions when managers have lower 
ownership stakes in the firm, the authors also argue that the inefficient capital allocation is likely 
due to agency costs. Stein (2003) summarizes the state of the empirical literature in his chapter 
on corporate investment in the Handbook of the Economics of Finance. He comes to the 
conclusion that “the weight of the current evidence” is that inefficient cross-subsidization exists 
within internal capital markets. 
 From a strategic management perspective, Bardolet et al. (2011) examine capital 
allocation decisions within the context of managerial biases (Zajac and Barney 1994; Gilbert 
2001; Garbuio et al. 2011). The authors use a unique combination of empirical and experimental 
tests to show that firms are cross-subsidizing segments in a socialistic manner. They find that 
firms tend to allocate capital evenly among all of their business units, regardless of investment 
opportunity set, size, and industry. While their empirical results are consistent with those from 
                                                 
10 Even more interesting, Gopalan et al. (2007) explain an underlying mechanism of these seemingly inefficient cash 
flow transfers. In contrast to a business segment in the U.S., Indian business groups can access the external capital 
markets directly. When an Indian business group is underperforming, its partners may subsidize the struggling 
business to help it avoid bankruptcy, because bankruptcy would have adverse effects on the surviving business 
groups as well. 
11 Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) is an “extensive reworking” of Scharfstein (1998), originally published via the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). They employ a non-parametric matching procedure to control for 
size, age, and profitability, a significant improvement over matched samples for multidivisional segments and 
focused firms in prior literature. 
12 
the extant literature, the authors use experimental tests to conclude that a naïve tendency to 
diversify is driving these inefficient allocation decisions, as opposed to agency conflicts.  
  
3     TOWARD A NEW MEASURE OF STRATEGIC CAPITAL ALLOCATION 
 This paper proposes that the empirical results in the extant literature may be driven 
largely by a measurement problem. From the traditional perspective, an internal capital market is 
deemed inefficient when the firm provides free cash flow to business units that have relatively 
worse investment opportunities than other units. The inefficient firm cross subsidizes these 
weaker divisions at the expense of divisions with relatively better investment opportunities. 
Researchers have traditionally employed uni-dimensional proxies to measure these investment 
opportunities for efficiency. These proxies include Tobin’s Q (Shin and Stulz 1998; Rajan et al. 
2000; Billett and Mauer 2003; Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010), sales growth (Lamont 1997), and 
return on assets (Billett and Mauer 2003). 
 I contend that these uni-dimensional measures are problematic because they ignore the 
possibility that firms make value-maximizing strategic trade-offs in the resource allocation 
process.12 One critical trade-off is the need for multidivisional firms to make investment 
decisions based on both current profitability and for future growth (Marris 1963; Marris 1964). 
Building on Penrose’s (1959) theory on the growth of firms, Marris (1963) shows that top 
management desires both profitability (i.e., size) and growth (i.e., positive changes in size). In 
the theoretical model, maximizing one strategic objective does not always maximize the other; 
                                                 
12 Rajan et al. (2001) also point out that a proxy for a division’s investment opportunities may need to be more 
nuanced than a uni-dimensional measure can capture. To account for the varying investment opportunities of large 
and small firms, they build a two-dimensional classification based on segment-level Tobin’s Q and an asset-
weighted Tobin’s Q. Other, more-nuanced proxies include sales per square foot (Khanna and Tice 2001) and total 
factor productivity (Maksimovic and Phillips 2002), both of which show efficient allocations of capital in their 
respective industry samples. Wulf (2002) also uses a two-dimensional approach based on ROA and the subjective 
recommendations of managers to analyze the resource allocation decision. 
13 
managers are forced to make strategic trade-offs between the two objectives. Similar economic 
models that highlight the trade-off between current profits and future growth are also developed 
by Baumol (1959) and Williamson (1964). 
 Uni-dimensional measures of capital allocation efficiency may also lack the nuance to 
capture the complex, multilayered process of resource allocation (Bower 1970; Burgelman 
1983). Bower (1970) documents the complexity of aligning the strategic objectives of a 
multidivisional firm to its capital allocation decisions.13 He builds a multilayered model where 
top-level management (corporate), general managers in the middle, and operating managers at 
the business-unit level all interact within the resource allocation process. Because this process is 
spread across multiple levels of the firm, the separate actors make decisions simultaneously in a 
complex, iterative process. Whereas Bower’s (1970) focus is on the structural context of the firm 
and its actors, Burgelman (1983) makes explicit the importance of the firm’s strategic context in 
the resource allocation process. This strategic context comprises the top-down declarations of 
corporate strategy as well as the individual strategic initiatives coming from the bottom-up. 
Together, Bower (1970) and Burgelman (1983) highlight the complex nature of identifying, 
evaluating, and eventually funding the firm’s investment opportunities. 
 If a uni-dimensional measure does not adequately capture the complex process of 
strategic capital allocation, it may misclassify an efficient internal capital market as an inefficient 
one, or vice versa. Further, if managerial allocation decisions are value-maximizing, a two-
dimensional measure that captures a critical strategic trade-off should improve our understanding 
of the association between the capital allocation process and performance. In the next section I 
                                                 
13 It is noteworthy that the original work of Bower (1970) was itself a response—from the perspective of corporate 
strategy and business policy—to the inability of the contemporaneous economics research, which was focused 
strictly on hurdle rates and the cost of capital, to capture the complexity of the resource allocation process. 
Allocation decisions of multidivisional firms are not simply made in the boardroom from a list of projects ranked by 
NPV, but instead are formulated on a business-by-business basis (Bower 1986).  
14 
begin to build a new measure of capital allocation efficiency that attempts to account for these 
two neglected phenomena in the literature. 
 
Building a Measure of Capital Allocation Efficiency 
 In order to build a measure of capital allocation efficiency, it is first necessary to establish 
the proposed construct of “efficiency.” I begin by following prior literature that classifies each 
segment within multidivisional firms on the basis of its investment opportunities, which I proxy 
for using Tobin’s Q.14 If the Tobin’s Q of the focal segment is higher than the asset-weighted 
average Q for the rest of the firm (i.e., all segments not including the focal segment), it is 
classified as having high investment opportunities. Similarly, a segment has low investment 
opportunities when its Q is lower than the asset-weighted average Q of the rest of the firm.15 A 
classification for return on assets (ROA), a proxy for segment performance, can be built in an 
analogous manner.16 An individual segment is classified as having high (low) profitability when 
its ROA is higher (lower) than the weighted-average ROA for the rest of the firm. 
 Next, by directly examining the cash flows (cf) and capital expenditures (capx) at the 
segment level, each segment is classified as being either a subsidized segment or a transferring 
segment. When the segment’s cash flow is less than the capital expenditure investment within the 
segment (cf < capx), it is classified as a subsidized segment. These segments require cross-
subsidizations from the firm to fund their capital investment needs. On the other hand, when the 
                                                 
14 Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of a firm’s market value to the book value of its assets, is a standard proxy for 
the investment opportunities of the firm. Intuitively, a higher Tobin’s Q indicates higher investment opportunities; a 
Tobin’s Q greater than one suggests that capital investments will yield positive returns, as measured by stock market 
value.  
15 Because Tobin’s Q cannot be calculated directly at the segment level, I follow Billett and Mauer (2003) in the 
construction of a fitted Q, which is described in more detail in Section 4. 
16 In their work, Billett and Mauer (2003) alternately use two separate proxies for the investment opportunities of the 
segment, either Tobin’s Q or ROA. Their construction of internal capital market efficiency is analogous for the two 
proxies, and the empirical results they present are also consistent when analyzing each proxy separately. 
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segment’s cash flow exceeds that of its capital expenditures (cf > capx), it is a transferring 
segment. These segments generate free cash flow that is transferred back to the firm.17 
 The final step in the construction of an efficiency measure of capital allocation is to 
classify each segment as either efficient or inefficient. Here, a theory of strategic capital 
allocation differs from prior literature. 
 Efficient capital allocation within the existing regime. According to the current 
measures of internal capital market efficiency, segments with stronger investment opportunities 
should be subsidized by those with weaker investment opportunities. Within the general 
construct of efficiency outlined above, a subsidized segment is efficient (from the perspective of 
prior literature in financial economics) when it has high Q. Conversely, a subsidized segment is 
inefficient if it has low Q; the firm should not cross subsidize segments with weaker investment 
opportunities by providing them with excess cash flow. A transferring segment (i.e., one which 
generates free cash flow) is inefficient if it has high Q, because segments with stronger 
investment opportunities should be reinvesting all of their cash. And conversely, a transferring 
segment is efficient if it has low Q; segments with weaker investment opportunities should 
transfer free cash flow back to the firm. 
 Efficient capital allocation within the strategy regime. This paper contends that such a 
uni-dimensional proxy for internal capital market efficiency may not capture the strategic trade-
offs and complexity inherent in the resource allocation process. Specifically, a measure must 
account for not only the investment opportunities of the segment, but also for its current 
profitability. Based on early work by Marris (1963; 1964), I construct a simple matrix to 
categorize each business segment along two dimensions: the growth potential of the business 
                                                 
17 Top management in the multidivisional firm has discretion to invest this excess cash in other business segments or 
to make external acquisitions, to return the cash to shareholders in the form of dividends or stock buybacks, or to 
simply hold the cash on the balance sheet. 
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(captured by Tobin’s Q) and its current profitability (captured by ROA). The nuance here is to 
capture the unique contribution of the segment’s investment opportunities in conjunction with its 
current profitability. Each segment is thus classified within a 2x2 matrix as having either high Q 
or low Q and either high ROA or low ROA. The remainder of the section now describes the 
theory of strategic capital allocation within the construct of this matrix.18  
 From a strategic management perspective, an efficient transfer reallocates free cash flow 
from business units with low Q and high ROA to subsidize investment opportunities in business 
units with high Q and low ROA. The former is an example of a profitable segment with minimal 
new growth opportunities, where additional investment of free cash flow is not expected to 
deliver profitable growth. The latter segment is where the firm needs to increase investment to 
establish its profitability. It is precisely these investments (in high Q and low ROA segments) 
that are captured by the implications of strategic resource combinations in Rumelt (1984) and 
Lippman and Rumelt (2003). Within the construct of the matrix, a transferring (subsidized) 
segment with low Q and high ROA is efficient (inefficient), while a transferring (subsidized) 
segment with high Q and low ROA is inefficient (efficient). 
 Segments with low Q and low ROA are the relatively worst performing lines of business 
within the firm. They are underperforming and have minimal new growth opportunities, and by 
definition, do not make compelling investments. Providing cash flow subsidies to these segments 
is always considered inefficient. Within the matrix, a transferring (subsidized) segment with low 
Q and low ROA is efficient (inefficient). It is important to emphasize here that all capital 
                                                 
 18 The categorization of strategic capital allocation that I outline in this section is similar to the normative 
prescriptions of the growth-share matrix originally developed in the late-1960s by the Boston Consulting Group 
(BCG). In the BCG matrix, free cash flow from Cows is used to subsidize investments in fast growing Question 
Marks (or Wildcats), while Stars and Dogs should be cash flow positive and self-sustaining (Henderson 1979; Stern 
and Deimler 2006). A theory of strategic capital allocation may seem either self-evident or controversial for some, 
because the general ideas were broached more than forty years ago. The approach adopted in this paper, while 
similar to the BCG matrix, is not a direct empirical test of its prescriptions (Nippa, Pidun, and Rubner 2011; Pidun et 
al. 2011). 
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expenditures in a low Q and low ROA segment are not necessarily inefficient. These 
underperforming segments with lower growth opportunities can still be efficient, as long as they 
do not require cross-subsidizations and are generating net positive cash flow for the rest of the 
firm. 
 The final strategic classification for high Q and high ROA segments differs from the 
traditional regime and bears some additional explanation. Drawing on entrepreneurial theories of 
strategy, where firms face the risk of over-investing in businesses where reinvestment rates are 
higher than growth and profitability rates (Rumelt 1984), I categorize a transferring (subsidized) 
segment with high Q and high ROA as efficient (inefficient). Subsidizing the high Q-high ROA 
segments with excess cash flow thus represents a strategic risk of overinvestment, which may 
never produce net positive cash flows. Further, the sustained success and future growth of firms 
depend not only on the exploitation of their existing resources, but primarily on the development 
of new resources (Wernerfelt 1984), e.g., by subsidizing the firm’s high Q-low ROA segments. 
Performance based on current resources is transitory, so firms must continually invest in new 
ones (Dierickx and Cool 1989), because building new strategic assets is necessary to sustain 
long-term competitive advantage (Markides and Williamson 1994; Agarwal and Helfat 2009). 
All of these arguments support the importance of not over-investing in the existing sources of the 
firm’s current performance by subsidizing segments with high Q and high ROA. 
 
4     METHODOLOGY 
 This paper compares the measurement of capital allocation efficiency under the existing 
approach and a new approach grounded in strategic management. I conduct the empirical 
analysis in two stages. In the first stage, I construct a two-dimensional measure of strategic 
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capital allocation and carry out a behavioral test of efficiency. If this new approach captures the 
strategic trade-offs faced by managers during the complex resource allocation process, I expect 
to find that capital allocation is significantly more efficient than prior literature suggests. In the 
second stage of the empirical analysis, I conduct a performance test of managerial investment 
decisions to validate the strategic measure of capital allocation efficiency. If managers are 
making this strategic trade-off in a value-maximizing manner, the strategic allocation of capital 
should be positively associated with firm-level performance. 
 
Stage 1: Behavioral Test of Strategic Capital Allocation 
 The behavioral test of allocation efficiency is a simple count of the inefficient segments 
as determined both under the traditional regime and when employing the new, multidimensional 
measure of strategic capital allocation. To compare the new approach of strategic capital 
allocation against a uni-dimensional measure, I follow the prescriptions described in the previous 
section to classify each segment within each firm as either efficient or inefficient. As described 
above, I expect the two-dimensional measure to indicate managers are acting more efficiently 
than prior measures for two reasons. First, the new measure should better capture the strategic 
trade-offs faced by top-level management, and second, it should also better capture the overall 
complexity of the strategic resource allocation process.  
 
Stage 2: Validate the Measure of Strategic Capital Allocation 
 The validity of any new measure depends on its ability to capture and predict the 
expected theoretical relationships (Venkatraman and Grant 1986). Strategic capital allocation 
attempts to measure management’s ability to reallocate capital toward “winners” and away from 
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“losers.” Intuitively, firms which make these value-maximizing strategic trade-offs should 
perform better than those which do not. If the new measure of strategic capital allocation is valid, 
it should be reflected in firm performance—the measure should be positively associated with 
market value. Meanwhile, based on the extant literature, I do not expect the traditional measure 
of capital allocation efficiency to show any association with firm performance. I test these 
expected empirical outcomes by calculating the firm-level measure of value-added from the 
internal capital market for both the traditional regime and the strategy regime. 
 Construction of the value-added measure. I follow Rajan et al. (2000) in calculating a 
measure of value-added from internal capital market allocations for each firm in each year: 
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The value-added measure calculates the amount (Amount) of each subsidy or transfer at the 
segment level as the absolute value of the difference between the segment’s cash flows and its 
capital expenditures.19 To capture the economic magnitude of the capital allocation decision for 
each segment, the subsidy or transfer amount is weighted by the difference between the focal 
segment’s ROA and the ROA of the rest of the firm. The whole measure is scaled by total assets 
to control for firm size. 
                                                 
19 Because a firm can only reallocate free cash flow in an amount that is actually generated by its segments, I also 
follow Billett and Mauer (2003) by not allowing transfers to exceed subsidies at the firm level. Further, any cash 
flow transfers must account for dividend payouts to shareholders, so an asset-allocated share of any firm-level 
dividends is subtracted from the amount of each transferring segment in the firm. Formulaically, the adjusted 
amount from a transferring segment is  
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where PTransferi is the potential transfer amount of segment i, measured as the positive difference between cash 
flow and capital expenditures adjusted for any dividend payouts. Likewise, the Subsidyi amount is the negative 
difference between cash flow and capital expenditures. 
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 This segment-level value is then multiplied by negative one (–1) for inefficient subsidies 
and transfers (as classified for each approach in the previous section), because these managerial 
decisions are assumed to detract from value-added. Finally, the firm-level value-added measure 
is the aggregation of all segment-level values. The intuition behind the value-added measure 
captures the basic premise that efficient allocations of capital should add to value, while 
inefficient allocations should detract from it. 
 I calculate two value-added measures for each firm in each year. One measure follows 
the uni-dimensional classification scheme for efficiency from the extant literature, while the 
other follows the theory of strategic capital allocation. Note that the general method for both 
calculations is exactly the same, following the process described above. Any difference between 
the two approaches, then, is a result of their different classification schemes for efficiency. For 
example, a subsidized segment with low ROA is inefficient when using the uni-dimensional 
measure, but if the segment is low ROA and high Q the strategy regime would classify it as 
efficient; it is this difference between classification schemes that will result in unique 
calculations of value-added for each regime.  
 Empirical tests. To test the association between the value-added measures of internal 
capital market efficiency, I regress firm-level performance on each measure of capital allocation 
value-added: 
,..2.10, tjtjtjtjtj ZXY εγςβββ +++++=  
where the primary dependent variable Y is the firm’s market value of equity20 and where X 
indicates the separate calculations of value-added from either the traditional regime or the 
strategy regime. Standard controls Z from the related literature in finance and economics are 
                                                 
20 I also find robust results using measures of firm-level ROA and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variables. Both of 
these output variables, however, present identification issues because the classification schemes for capital 
allocation efficiency require the use of both ROA and Tobin’s Q on the right-hand side of the model as well. 
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employed (i.e., liquidity, leverage, the log of consumer price index-adjusted assets, and total 
number of segments), and the model implements fixed-effects with firm-specific intercepts and 
fiscal-year dummies. The summary statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Table 1. If 
the new measure of strategic capital allocation is capturing the complex, value-maximizing 
trade-offs that managers face between future growth opportunities and current profitability, the 
coefficient on β1 for the strategy regime should show the expected positive association with firm-
level performance, while β1 for the traditional regime should be insignificant. 
 
Sample Description 
 I follow prior research on the efficiency of internal capital markets in constructing my 
data sample (see, e.g., Berger and Ofek 1995, Billett and Mauer 2003, or Ozbas and Scharfstein 
2010). I start with all multisegment firms between 1979 and 2009 from the Compustat Segment 
File. Observations are excluded if capital expenditure data is missing or if complete data is not 
available to calculate the segment’s annual cash flow using operating profit and depreciation.21 I 
also collect the corresponding firm-level values from Compustat. Firms with less than $20 
million in either total revenue or total assets are excluded, as are firms in the agricultural (SIC 0-
999) and financial sectors (SIC 6000-6999). Two years of complete data are required. 
 Prior literature also excludes firms where the sum of segment-level values are not within 
a prescribed percentage (usually 1% or 5% for revenue and 25% for assets) of the reported 
values at the firm level. The rationale is to limit observations with potential reporting errors 
between segment-level and firm-level data. These differences, however, are not necessarily 
indicative of reporting errors, but instead are often the natural result of managerial discretion 
                                                 
21 Interest expense and tax expense are only recorded at the firm level. To calculate segment-level cash flow, I 
follow prior literature in allocating these firm-level expenses based on the asset size of each segment. 
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afforded to firms in their segment-level reporting of accounting numbers.22 The conclusions in 
this paper are consistent whether these firms with differences are excluded from the sample or 
not, so I report all results with the fuller data set. Similar to prior literature, I scale the amounts of 
segment-level revenue and segment-level assets to match those from the firm-level report.23  
 The final sample from 1979 to 2009 is comprised of 89,468 segment-year observations 
and 30,257 firm-year observations. By way of comparison, the sample in Billett and Mauer 
(2003) ranges from 1990 to 1998, and is comprised of 5,857 segment-year observations. All of 
the empirical results reported in this paper are consistent to those when I limit my sample period 
and selection criteria to match Billett and Mauer (2003).24 
 Construction of key variables in the sample. I closely follow prior literature to construct 
the primary variables for the analysis. Segment-level cash flow (cf) is calculated as the segment’s 
operating profit (ops) plus depreciation (dp). I also adjust cf for the segment-level asset-weighted 
average for taxes (txt) and interest (xint), since these variables are not available directly at the 
segment level. Return on assets at the segment level is calculated as ops divided by its 
beginning-of-period total assets (opst / at t-1). 
 Tobin’s Q cannot be calculated directly at the segment level because market values are 
not available, so I follow Billett and Mauer (2003) in the construction of a fitted Q. First, I 
calculate the Tobin’s Q of all single-segment firms (Qss) and perform separate industry-year 
regressions of this Tobin’s Q on each firm’s total assets (TAss), operating profit (OPSss), and 
revenue (Salesss): 
                                                 
22 In a current working project, Ma and Vieregger (2012) observe firms that report segment- and firm-level 
discrepancies in their 10-K typically provide a descriptive rationale in the management discussion section for these 
differences. 
23 For example, if the sum of segment revenue is 3% less than the total of firm revenue, each segment is scaled by an 
asset-weighted 3%, so the segment and firm totals match in the final analysis. 
24 When I replicate the sample construction in Billett and Mauer (2003), I have 6,418 segment-year observations. 
The small difference is likely due to changes in the Compustat Segment File over the years. 
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tsstsstsstjss SalesOPSTAQ ,3,2,10,, ββββ +++= , 
where j is the two-digit SIC industry of the single-segment firm and t is the fiscal year.25 Next, I 
use these industry-year coefficient estimates to predict a fitted Tobin’s Q at the segment level, 
based on the actual assets, profitability, and revenue of each segment: 
titititi SalesOPSTAQ ,3,2,10,
ˆˆˆˆˆ ββββ +++= . 
The result is a fitted Q for each segment within the sample of multidivisional firms.26 This 
estimation approach endeavors to reduce the measurement error inherent in using single-segment 
peers as a proxy for the Q of individual segments in a multi-segment firm. 
 
5     EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 The empirical analysis in this paper considers the measurement of capital allocation 
efficiency based on both extant theory and the principles of strategic management. The first stage 
of the analysis compares the efficiency of segment-level allocations using the uni-dimensional 
measure developed in Billett and Mauer (2003) against a new, multidimensional measure of 
strategic capital allocation. In the second stage, I attempt to confirm the validity of the new 
measure of strategic capital allocation. 
 
Stage 1: Behavioral Test of Strategic Capital Allocation 
 The results from the first test are presented in Table 2. Column A is a simplified 
reproduction of the original results from Billett and Mauer (2003).27 They find that firms are 
                                                 
25 These firm-level characteristics represent the key data available for segments in the Compustat Segment File. TA 
is the log of CPI-adjusted total assets. OPS and Sales are scaled by total assets. 
26 The fitted Q is truncated if it is larger (smaller) than the maximum (minimum) of the Tobin’s Q from the industry-
year regression from the first step. 
27 In their paper, Billett and Mauer (2003) present these results within categories based on the financial constraints 
of each segment. I merely condense those results here. 
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allocating capital efficiently at the segment level only 24% of the time, and their results are 
consistent whether alternately using Tobin’s Q or ROA as the proxy for investment 
opportunities. 
 Column B corroborates these results using the much larger sample in this paper.28 Similar 
to Billett and Mauer (2003), I show that a uni-dimensional measure for internal capital markets 
finds efficient allocation only 27% of the time. It is compelling that these results are consistent 
over the complete time period in this paper, from 1979 to 2009. Equally important, the 
replication of these results also finds that 55% of segments are subsidized segments (compared to 
57% in Billett and Mauer 2003), while the remaining 45% are transferring segments (compared 
to 43%). I conclude that my replication is accurate. 
 Next, I evaluate internal capital market efficiency following the principles of strategic 
management, as detailed in Section 3. Column C of Table 2 shows the main results from the first 
stage of the empirical analysis. Compared to the uni-dimensional measure employed in Columns 
A and B, I find that firms allocate capital efficiently 53% of the time under a strategic measure of 
capital allocation efficiency—more than twice as often than under the current approach. The 
results suggest that managers do face a strategic trade-off between current profitability and future 
growth opportunities during the resource allocation process. The failure to account for these 
trade-offs, which have been neglected in prior literature on the resource allocation process, 
significantly increases the appearance that firms are allocating capital inefficiently at the segment 
level. 
 
                                                 
28 The sample size in this paper is much larger than in Billett and Mauer (2003) due to two factors. The first is the 
longer timeframe (1979-2009 compared to 1990-1998). The second reason is described in detail in the sample 
description; the sample in this paper does not drop observations where segment-level aggregations of revenue or 
assets differ from those of firm-level reports. The results in this paper are consistent when the sample size matches 
that in Billett and Mauer (2003) and when the observations with assumed discrepancies are also dropped.  
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Stage 2: Validate the Measure of Strategic Capital Allocation 
 In the behavioral test above, I find that managers appear to allocate capital significantly 
more efficiently when the analysis accounts for both current profitability and future growth 
opportunities. In the second stage I attempt to validate these results by testing the association of 
strategic capital allocation with firm-level performance. If the new measure of strategic capital 
allocation is capturing the complex, value-maximizing strategic trade-offs managers face, the 
measure should show a positive association with performance. 
 Table 3 presents the main results for the test of validity. Models 1-4 are baseline tests for 
the association between the uni-dimensional measure of internal capital market efficiency and 
market value. As expected, the coefficients in Models 1-4 demonstrate that a the existing 
measure need not show a significantly positive association with firm performance. The results 
are comparable to those in Billett and Mauer (2003), who find that the overall measure of value-
added is not significantly different from zero in their tests of excess value. They also show that 
firms only create value by making efficient transfers to segments that are otherwise financially 
constrained, a key idea behind internal capital market efficiency from a finance perspective. 
 Models 5-8 in Table 3 demonstrate that the new measure of strategic capital allocation 
efficiency appears valid. While the results presented here use the market value of equity as the 
dependent variable, similar results are obtained when using ROA and Tobin’s Q as proxies for 
firm-level performance. Models 5 and 6 show a significantly positive association between the 
value-added measure of strategic capital allocation and the market value of equity. The one-year 
lag on the measure of value-added from strategic capital allocation in Models 7 and 8 is also 
significant, suggesting an important relationship between the value-maximizing strategic trade-
26 
offs that managers face today and firm-level performance in the future. This result is consistent 
with long-term performance implications of strategic capital allocation decisions. 
 To investigate these long-term implications more explicitly, I perform additional tests of 
the association between the value-added measures of efficiency and firm-level performance. As a 
way to capture the cumulative value of prior investment decisions, I sum the value-added 
measure across multiple years for each firm to create new explanatory variables for both 
regimes. I calculate cumulative value-added for three years and for five years in each regime. 
The results from these tests are presented in Table 4, and they provide strong evidence for the 
long-term importance of strategic trade-offs faced by managers. Consistent with the main 
regression results above, Models 1-3 show that the value-added measure from the extant 
approach is not significant in any tests. In Models 4-6, however, the measure of strategic capital 
allocation is significantly associated with firm performance at three and at five years. The 
strategic implications of capital allocation decisions appear to be important for up to five years 
following management’s original investment decision. 
 
6     CONCLUSION 
 The capital allocation process is a critical component of strategic execution for 
multidivisional firms. Chandler (1962) goes so far as to define strategy in terms of the resource 
allocation process, and many others have explicitly recognized capital allocation decisions as the 
most important component for the success of multidivisional firms (Williamson 1975; Bower 
1970; Rumelt 1984; Bardolet et al. 2011). Despite this importance, strategy scholars have ceded 
much of the theoretical and empirical work in capital allocation efficiency to the domains of 
finance and economics (Stein 2003). The bulk of this research (Lamont 1997; Shin and Stulz 
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1998; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003; Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru 
2007; Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010), as well as the evidence from prominent field studies in 
strategic management (Christensen and Bower 1996; Sull 1999), concludes that managers make 
significantly inefficient capital allocation decisions—a result that should be of concern to 
business managers and strategy scholars alike. 
 This paper asks whether managers are truly allocating capital so inefficiently, or do they 
instead have rational, strategic objectives that explain their investment decisions. Building off the 
general framework of internal capital market efficiency from financial economics (Berger and 
Ofek 1995; Rajan et al. 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003), this paper develops a new measure of 
strategic capital allocation. The new approach introduces a multidimensional measure to capture 
the strategic trade-offs between future growth and current profitability (Marris 1963; Marris 
1964; Williamson 1964), which are faced by managers during the complex resource allocation 
process (Bower 1970; Burgelman 1983). In the first stage of the empirical analysis, managers are 
found to be allocating capital more than twice as efficiently than prior literature suggests. The 
second stage validates this multidimensional approach by demonstrating the predicted theoretical 
relationship between a strategic measure of capital allocation and firm-level value, namely, that 
managers appear to be capable of enhancing performance through strategic capital allocation. 
 One limitation of the research design in this paper is that a normative link between capital 
allocation efficiency and firm-level performance requires the researcher to prescribe a definition 
of efficiency. While little theory exists, I attempt to mitigate some concern by drawing on the 
established precepts of the resource-based theory of the firm (Wernferfelt 1984; Dierickx and 
Cool 1989; Rumelt 1994; Markides and Williamson 1994; Lippman and Rumelt 2003; Agarwal 
and Helfat 2009). I further attempt to moderate the normative limitations of this approach in 
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Stage 2 of the empirical analysis. By demonstrating the consistency of the value-added measure 
of strategic capital allocation with its theoretical predictions, the results here validate the new, 
multidimensional of strategic capital allocation. Considering the significance of the results, 
however, additional large-scale and industry-specific empirical work may still be necessary to 
bolster our understanding of strategic capital allocation. 
 This paper makes two important contributions, which I will explore in turn for the 
remainder of this paper. First, the paper investigates a fundamental component of strategic 
management theory and practice—the efficiency of a firm’s internal capital allocation 
processes—that has been largely neglected by strategy scholars of late. The third contribution is 
of paramount importance for the practice of strategy: the results in this paper provide insight for 
managers on how to create value through strategic capital allocation. 
 Because of the importance of internal capital market efficiency to strategic execution 
(Chandler 1962; Williamson 1975; Bower 1970), this paper endeavors to establish that the an 
influential research agenda on the resource allocation process should once again be driven by 
scholars from the strategy disciplines. We know that managers make strategic trade-offs in the 
complex process of resource allocation, but prior examinations of capital allocation efficiency 
have neglected to consider the impact of these trade-offs.29 We also know that resource 
allocation within the multidivisional firm is a complex, multilayered process (Bower 1970), 
formulated not only by top-down declarations of corporate strategy but also by bottom-up 
strategic impetuses (Burgelman 1983). An appreciation for these strategic trade-offs and 
complexities, as well as the managerial biases inherent in them (Garbuio et al. 2011; Bardolet et 
al. 2011), may yield further insights into strategic capital allocation.  
                                                 
29 Porter (1996) argues that managing complex trade-offs between strategic activities is the very essence of strategy. 
29 
 A second contribution from this paper is of practical concern to top management teams 
responsible for their firms’ capital allocation decisions. Recent articles in practitioner-oriented 
journals, such as the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Pidun et al. 2011) and McKinsey 
Quarterly (Hall et al. 2012), highlight the importance of the resource allocation process to top-
level management teams. The new measure of strategic capital allocation in this paper builds on 
the extant empirical results, following a interdisciplinary, integrative approach (Jemison 1981) to 
research, which is important for business managers. Nearly three decades ago, Bettis (1983, 414) 
wrote:  
Relevant results from modern financial theory should be incorporated into the strategic 
management literature, and conversely. … Ultimately such a synthesis is essential, or else 
practitioners will be forced to select among contradictory paradigms—a most undesirable 
circumstance.  
 
Despite the importance of the resource allocation process to practitioners, the bulk of research in 
both strategy and financial economics has accepted the paradigm (Kuhn 1962) that top-level 
managers of multidivisional firms quite regularly misallocate capital resources. This paradigm of 
inefficiency has driven a research agenda that focuses on managing agency costs in order to limit 
either the ignorance or malfeasance of managers. The results in this paper, however, suggest that 
managers may indeed be able to create value through the resource allocation process, and future 
research should seek to explore theories of how managers can best improve performance through 
strategic capital allocation.  
 
30 
REFERENCES 
 
Agarwal, Rajshree, and Constance E. Helfat. 2009. “Strategic Renewal of Organizations.” 
Organization Science 20 (2) (March 1): 281–293. 
Ahn, Seoungpil, and David J. Denis. 2004. “Internal Capital Markets and Investment Policy: 
Evidence from Corporate Spinoffs.” Journal of Financial Economics 71 (3): 489–516. 
Alok, Shashwat, and Radhakrishnan Gopalan. 2012. “How Do Conglomerates Structure Division 
Manager Incentive Contracts?” Working Paper. 
Bardolet, David, Craig R. Fox, and Dan Lovallo. 2011. “Corporate Capital Allocation: a 
Behavioral Perspective.” Strategic Management Journal 32 (13) (December 1): 1465–
1483. 
Barney, Jay B., and Edward J. Zajac. 1994. “Competitive Organizational Behavior: Toward an 
Organizationally-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage.” Strategic Management 
Journal 15 (December 1): 5–9. 
Baumol, William J. 1959. Business Behavior, Value and Growth. New York: Macmillan Press. 
Berger, Philip G., and Eli Ofek. 1995. “Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 37 (1) (January): 39–65. 
Bettis, Richard A. 1983. “Modern Financial Theory, Corporate Strategy and Public Policy: Three 
Conundrums.” The Academy of Management Review 8 (3) (July 1): 406–415. 
Billett, Matthew T., and David C. Mauer. 2003. “Cross-Subsidies, External Financing 
Constraints, and the Contribution of the Internal Capital Market to Firm Value.” The 
Review of Financial Studies 16 (4) (December 1): 1167–1201. 
Bower, Joseph L. 1970. Managing the Resource Allocation Process. Division of Research, 
Harvard University. 
31 
———. 1986. “Preface to the Harvard Business School Classics Edition.” In Managing the 
Resource Allocation Process: A Study of Corporate Planning and Investment. Harvard 
Business School Classics 3. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Bower, Joseph L., Yves L. Doz, and Clark C. Gilbert. 2005. “Linking Resource Allocation to 
Strategy.” In From Resource Allocation to Strategy, edited by Joseph L. Bower and Clark 
C. Gilbert, 3–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bromiley, Philip. 1986. Corporate Capital Investment: A Behavioral Approach. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bryce, David J., and Sidney G. Winter. 2009. “A General Interindustry Relatedness Index.” 
Management Science 55 (9) (September 1): 1570–1585. 
Burch, Timothy R., and Vikram Nanda. 2003. “Divisional Diversity and the Conglomerate 
Discount: Evidence from Spinoffs.” Journal of Financial Economics 70 (1): 69–98. 
Burgelman, Robert A. 1983. “A Model of the Interaction of Strategic Behavior, Corporate 
Context, and the Concept of Strategy.” The Academy of Management Review 8 (1) 
(January 1): 61–70. 
Campa, Jose Manuel, and Simi Kedia. 2002. “Explaining the Diversification Discount.” The 
Journal of Finance 57 (4): 1731–1762. 
Chandler, Alfred D. 1962. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial 
Enterprise. MIT Press. 
Chevalier, Judith. 2004. “What Do We Know About Cross-subsidization?  Evidence from 
Merging Firms.” Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy 4 (1). 
32 
Christensen, Clayton M., and Joseph L. Bower. 1996. “Customer Power, Strategic Investment, 
and the Failure of Leading Firms.” Strategic Management Journal 17 (3) (March 1): 
197–218. 
Dierickx, Ingemar, and Karel Cool. 1989. “Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of 
Competitive Advantage.” Management Science 35 (12) (December 1): 1504–1511. 
Dittmar, Amy, and Anil Shivdasani. 2003. “Divestitures and Divisional Investment Policies.” 
The Journal of Finance 58 (6) (December 1): 2711–2743. 
Duhaime, Irene M., and John H. Grant. 1984. “Factors Influencing Divestment 
Decision‐making: Evidence from a Field Study.” Strategic Management Journal 5 (4) 
(October 1): 301–318. 
Duhaime, Irene M., and Charles R. Schwenk. 1985. “Conjectures on Cognitive Simplification in 
Acquisition and Divestment Decision Making.” The Academy of Management Review 10 
(2) (April 1): 287–295. doi:10.2307/257970. 
Eisenmann, Thomas R., and Joseph L. Bower. 2000. “The Entrepreneurial M-Form: Strategic 
Integration in Global Media Firms.” Organization Science 11 (3) (May 1): 348–355. 
Elfenbein, Daniel W., and Anne Marie Knott. 2011. “No Exit: Failure to Exit Under 
Uncertainty.” SSRN eLibrary (September 20). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641242. 
Garbuio, Massimo, Adelaide Wilcox King, and Dan Lovallo. 2011. “Looking Inside.” Journal of 
Management 37 (5): 1444–1463. 
Gertner, Robert H., Eric Powers, and David S. Scharfstein. 2002. “Learning About Internal 
Capital Markets from Corporate Spin-offs.” The Journal of Finance 57 (6) (December): 
2479–2506. 
33 
Gertner, Robert H., David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. Stein. 1994. “Internal Versus External 
Capital Markets.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4) (November 1): 1211 –
1230. 
Gilbert, Clark G. 2001. “A Dilemma in Response: Examining the Newspaper Industry’s 
Response to the Internet.” The Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings Series. 
Gilbert, Clark G., and Clayton M. Christensen. 2005. “Anomaly-Seeking Research: Thirty Years 
of Development in Resource Allocation Theory.” In From Resource Allocation to 
Strategy, edited by Joseph L. Bower and Clark C. Gilbert, 71–89. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gopalan, Radhakrishnan, Vikram Nanda, and Amit Seru. 2007. “Affiliated Firms and Financial 
Support: Evidence from Indian Business Groups.” Journal of Financial Economics 86 
(3): 759–795. 
Graham, John R., Michael L. Lemmon, and Jack G. Wolf. 2002. “Does Corporate 
Diversification Destroy Value?” The Journal of Finance 57 (2) (April 1): 695–720. 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. 1986. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” The Journal of Political Economy 94 (4): 
691–719. 
Hall, Stephen, Dan Lovallo, and Reinier Musters. 2012. “How to Put Your Money Where Your 
Strategy Is.” McKinsey Quarterly (March). 
Henderson, Bruce D. 1979. Henderson on Corporate Strategy. Cambridge, Mass: Abt Books. 
Jemison, David B. 1981. “The Contributions of Administrative Behavior to Strategic 
Management.” The Academy of Management Review 6 (4) (October 1): 633–642. 
34 
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1984. “Choices, Values, and Frames.” American Psychologist 
39 (4): 341. 
Khanna, Naveen, and Sheri Tice. 2001. “The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets.” The 
Journal of Finance 56 (4): 1489–1528. 
Kuemmerle, Walter. 1999. “The Drivers of Foreign Direct Investment into Research and 
Development.” Journal of International Business Studies 30 (I): 1–24. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Lang, Larry H. P., and René M. Stulz. 1994. “Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm 
Performance.” The Journal of Political Economy 102 (6) (December 1): 1248–1280. 
Lippman, Steven A., and Richard P. Rumelt. 2003. “A Bargaining Perspective on Resource 
Advantage.” Strategic Management Journal 24 (11): 1069–1086. 
Lubatkin, M., H. Merchant, and N. Srinivasan. 1993. “Construct Validity of Some Unweighted 
Product-count Diversification Measures.” Strategic Management Journal 14 (6): 433–
449. 
Ma, Tao, and Carl Vieregger. 2012. “Segment Reporting and Analyst Forecasts.” Working 
Paper. 
Maksimovic, Vojislav, and Gordon Phillips. 2002. “Do Conglomerate Firms Allocate Resources 
Inefficiently Across Industries? Theory and Evidence.” The Journal of Finance 57 (2) 
(April 1): 721–767. 
Markides, Constantinos C., and Peter J. Williamson. 1994. “Related Diversification, Core 
Competences and Corporate Performance.” Strategic Management Journal 15 (S2): 149–
165. 
35 
Marris, Robin. 1963. “A Model of the ‘Managerial’ Enterprise.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 77 (2) (May 1): 185 –209. 
———. 1964. The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism. London: Macmillan Press. 
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1990. “Bargaining, Influence Costs, and Organization.” In 
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. 
Shepsle. Cambridge University Press. 
Nippa, Michael, Ulrich Pidun, and Harald Rubner. 2011. “Corporate Portfolio Management.” 
The Academy of Management Perspectives 25 (4): 50–66. 
Noda, Tomo, and Joseph L. Bower. 1996. “Strategy Making as Iterated Processes of Resource 
Allocation.” Strategic Management Journal 17 (S1): 159–192. 
Ozbas, O., and D. S Scharfstein. 2010. “Evidence on the Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets.” 
Review of Financial Studies 23 (2): 581. 
Penrose, Edith. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Peter, J. Paul. 1979. “Reliability: A Review of Psychometric Basics and Recent Marketing 
Practices.” Journal of Marketing Research 16 (1) (February 1): 6–17. 
doi:10.2307/3150868. 
Peyer, Urs C. 2002. “Internal and External Capital Markets.” Working Paper, INSEAD. 
Pidun, Ulrich, Harald Rubner, Matthias Krühler, Robert Untiedt, and Michael Nippa. 2011. 
“Corporate Portfolio Management: Theory and Practice.” Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 23 (1): 63–76. 
Porter, Michael E. 1996. “What Is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review 74 (6) (November): 61–
78. 
36 
Rajan, Raghuram, Henri Servaes, and Luigi Zingales. 2000. “The Cost of Diversity: The 
Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment.” The Journal of Finance 55 (1) 
(February 1): 35–80. 
Rumelt, Richard P. 1984. “Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm.” In Competitive Strategic 
Management, 556–570. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Scharfstein, David S. 1998. “The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from 
Diversified Conglomerates.” SSRN eLibrary (January). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226103. 
Scharfstein, David S., and Jeremy C. Stein. 2000. “The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: 
Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment.” The Journal of Finance 55 (6) 
(December 1): 2537–2564. 
Servaes, Henri. 1996. “The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave.” 
The Journal of Finance 51 (4): 1201–1225. doi:10.2307/2329392. 
Shimizu, Katsuhiko. 2007. “Prospect Theory, Behavioral Theory, and the Threat-Rigidity 
Thesis: Combinative Effects on Organizational Decisions to Divest Formerly Acquired 
Units.” The Academy of Management Journal ARCHIVE 50 (6) (December 1): 1495–
1514. 
Shimizu, Katsuhiko, and Michael A. Hitt. 2005. “What Constrains or Facilitates Divestitures of 
Formerly Acquired Firms? The Effects of Organizational Inertia.” Journal of 
Management 31 (1): 50–72. 
Shin, Hyun-Han, and René M. Stulz. 1998. “Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (2) (May 1): 531–552. 
37 
Stein, Jeremy C. 1997. “Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources.” 
The Journal of Finance 52 (1) (March 1): 111–133. doi:10.2307/2329558. 
———. 2003. “Agency, Information and Corporate Investment.” Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance 1: 111–165. 
Stern, Carl W, and Michael S Deimler, ed. 2006. The Boston Consulting Group on Strategy. 2nd 
ed. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons. 
Sull, Donald N. 1999. “The Dynamics of Standing Still: Firestone Tire & Rubber and the Radial 
Revolution.” The Business History Review 73 (3) (October 1): 430–464. 
Venkatraman, N., and John H. Grant. 1986. “Construct Measurement in Organizational Strategy 
Research: A Critique and Proposal.” The Academy of Management Review 11 (1) 
(January 1): 71–87. doi:10.2307/258332. 
Villalonga, Belén. 2004. “Does Diversification Cause the ‘Diversification Discount’?” Financial 
Management 33 (2): 5–27. 
doi:http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118902563/home. 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. “A Resource-based View of the Firm.” Strategic Management Journal 5 
(2): 171–180. 
Whited, Toni M. 2001. “Is It Inefficient Investment That Causes the Diversification Discount?” 
The Journal of Finance 56 (5) (October 1): 1667–1691. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1964. The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives 
in a Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
———. 1970. Corporate Control and Business Behavior: An Inquiry into the Effects of 
Organization Form on Enterprise Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
38 
———. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the 
Economics of Internal Organization. Free Press. 
Wulf, Julie. 2002. “Internal Capital Markets and Firm-Level Compensation Incentives for 
Division Managers.” Journal of Labor Economics 20 (S2) (April 1): S219–S262. 
39 
 
Table 1: Data Correlations
ICM Lag ICM SCA Lag SCA Liquidity Leverage Log Assets Segments
ICM 1.000
Lag ICM 0.760 1.000
SCA 0.021 0.069 1.000
Lag SCA 0.035 0.199 0.596 1.000
Liquidity -0.058 -0.087 0.014 0.035 1.000
Leverage -0.022 -0.023 0.028 -0.007 -0.296 1.000
Log Assets 0.024 0.011 -0.016 -0.013 -0.073 0.078 1.000
Segments -0.050 -0.050 0.064 0.056 -0.031 -0.050 0.030 1.000
ICM = Value Added Measure of Internal Capital Market
SCA = Value Added Measure of Strategic Capital Allocation  
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Table 2: Stage 1 Empricial Results
Segments Percentage Segments Percentage Segments Percentage
Efficient Subsidized 850 25% 14776 30% 11225 23%
Inefficient Subsidized 2502 75% 34676 70% 38227 77%
Total Subsidized 3352 57% 49452 55% 49452 55%
Efficient Transferring 573 23% 9457 24% 36524 91%
Inefficient Transferring 1932 77% 30559 76% 3492 9%
Total Transferring 2505 43% 40016 45% 40016 45%
Total Efficient Segments 1423 24% 24233 27% 47749 53%
Total Inefficient Segments 4434 76% 65235 73% 41719 47%
Total Segments 5857 100% 89468 100% 89468 100%
Column A is a condensed version of Table 2 from Billett and Mauer (2003). Column B replicates the finance ICM measure using the larger
sample size in this paper. Column C presents the capital market efficiency based on the strategic capital allocation.
Column A Column B Column C
B&M (2003) ICM Strategic Capital AllocationICM Replication
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Table 3: Stage 2 Regression Results
Dependent Variable = Firm Market Value
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
ICM Value Added 0.083 -0.034
(0.063) (0.055)
Lag of ICM Value Added -0.089 -0.184**
(0.072) (0.078)
SCA Value Added 0.216* 0.278**
(0.124) (0.133)
Lag of SCA Value Added 0.238** 0.193**
(0.117) (0.094)
Liquidity 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.007
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Leverage -1.411*** -1.400*** -1.412*** -1.396***
(0.094) (0.106) (0.093) (0.106)
Log of CPI Adj. Assets 0.681*** 0.709*** 0.682*** 0.708***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028)
No. of Segments 0.022** 0.025** 0.022** 0.026**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.463*** 2.083*** 6.561*** 1.742*** 6.463*** 2.079*** 6.563*** 1.750***
(0.029) (0.194) (0.047) (0.202) (0.029) (0.194) (0.047) (0.202)
N 30257 29485 25223 24563 30257 29485 25223 24563
R
2
0.305 0.436 0.324 0.457 0.305 0.437 0.324 0.457
All standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level:  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Long-term Implications of Capital Allocation Decisions
Dependent Variable = Firm Market Value
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ICM 1-Year ICM 3-Year ICM 5-Year SCA 1-Year SCA 3-Year SCA 5-Year
Value-Added Measures -0.034 -0.053 -0.039 0.278** 0.156** 0.160**
(0.055) (0.046) (0.043) (0.133) (0.068) (0.075)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.083*** 1.886*** 2.367*** 2.079*** 1.897*** 2.390***
(0.194) -0.285 -0.37 (0.194) -0.285 -0.37
N 29485 17526 12184 29485 17526 12184
R
2
0.436 0.45 0.448 0.437 0.45 0.449
All standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level: * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
Regressors for ICM and SCA are the summation of either 3-years or 5-years of value-added from capital market efficiency.  
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Chasing their Tails:  Why Do Firms Subsidize Underperforming Business Units? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Firms repeatedly fail to exit from underperforming lines of business. Despite the prevalence and 
economic import of this failure to exit, scant empirical research explores the managerial motives 
of delayed exit. To address this question, I build a novel sample of underperforming business 
units that are being cross-subsidized by the internal capital market of conglomerate firms. Within 
this sample, firms repeat their subsidizing investments approximately 48% of the time, and the 
average length of cross-subsidization is an additional 5.6 years. In the main test of the paper, I 
examine the extent to which these seemingly inefficient investment decisions are driven by 
perceived synergies between the firm’s business units. While I do find evidence that synergies 
may provide a strategic rationale for the prevalence of cross-subsidization, managers are 
ultimately not enhancing firm-level performance via these synergistic investment decisions. 
Additional tests suggest that hubris and escalation of commitment may be playing a more 
significant role. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Firms repeatedly fail to exit from underperforming lines of business. Elfenbein and Knott (2011), 
for example, find that nearly 50% of exit occurs more than three years after an economically-
modeled threshold would predict. In another study, 65% of divestitures resulting from external 
pressures were only executed after long delays and in the face of persistent underperformance 
(Dranikoff, Koller, and Schneider 2002). Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991) demonstrate that 
managers delay exit until the business unit has significantly underperformed for as many as 
seven years, and Caves (1998) finds that these divestitures tend to occur at the bottom of 
macroeconomic business cycles. More recently, Brauer and Wiersema (2012) find that exiting at 
the peak of a divestiture wave, i.e., when the decision is likely to be imitative of competitors, 
generates the lowest stock market returns. Practitioner anecdotes of delayed exit are also 
plentiful (e.g., Horn, Lovallo, and Viguerie 2006). In the strategic management literature, Sull 
(1999) details how Firestone Tire and Rubber subsidized its bias tire production during the 
1970s, even though the market was disappearing and the business was losing money. He 
concludes: “Although the motives for delaying exit may have been admirable, the financial 
results were disastrous” (Sull 1999, 448). 
 Considering the prevalence and economic import of the problem, scant empirical research 
has been conducted to understand the managerial motives of delayed exit.30 In a comprehensive 
review of the literature on divestment, Brauer (2006, 775) specifically calls for research on the 
“potentially anomalous cases” of delayed divestment, where firms fail to exit their 
underperforming business units. Elfenbein and Knott (2011), as noted above, is an exception. 
They decompose rational versus behavioral effects on organizational delay to find evidence that, 
                                                 
30 I purposely distinguish here between traditional research on the divestment decision, which I will review briefly in 
the next section, and research on the delayed divestment of underperforming business units. 
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while a portion of delay is rational, the behavioral biases of managers play a significant role in 
the decision to delay exit. These biases are exacerbated by separated ownership and control. 
Anecdotal conclusions from practitioner journals often find similar results, explaining failure to 
exit as a result of the psychological biases of managers not willing to “let go” of failing 
businesses (Horn et al. 2006). Likewise, the predominant conclusion from the literature on 
internal capital markets is that firms consistently make inefficient investment allocation 
decisions (see Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo 2011 for an example and a review of the literature).31 
In this paper, I integrate the literature of divestitures with that of internal capital markets to 
examine whether managers are instead following a rational strategy of delayed exit—making 
repeated, cross-subsidizing investments in underperforming business units, in an attempt to 
exploit synergies that can create returns to scale or scope. 
 To examine the question of delayed exit, I begin by constructing a novel sample of 
underperforming business units that are also being repeatedly cross-subsidized via the internal 
capital market of diversified firms. A business unit is cross-subsidized when its capital 
investments exceed its internally generated cash flows because, as standalone firms, these units 
would likely need access to prohibitively expensive external markets for this additional 
financing.32 I use a competing hazards model to estimate the likelihood of exit within this 
sample. In addition to the primary exit event, the competing hazards model can account for 
contingent events, which allows me to also control for the efficient re-allocation of capital that 
may precede exit. My primary variable for the strategic rationale of delayed exit is the 
relatedness between the subsidized business unit and other units within the firm, drawing on the 
                                                 
31 Vieregger (2012) is an exception. 
32 External capital is likely to be prohibitively expensive for these business units precisely because they are 
underperforming and have minimal growth opportunities. They lack cash flow to support new debt payments and are 
unlikely to attract equity capital either. 
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general interindustry relatedness index from Bryce and Winter (2009) to construct a proxy for 
synergy.33 
 This sample of capital investment decisions, examined from within the firm’s internal 
capital market, provides a compelling setting to examine why firms fail to exit their 
underperforming business units. Within the sample, the probability of repeating a cross-
subsidizing investment from one year to the next is approximately 48%, which is the second-
most persistent type of conglomerate investment. On average, these firms then continue to cross-
subsidize the underperforming business for another 5.6 years. My main results show that firms 
are significantly more likely to continue their cross-subsidization of an underperforming business 
unit when that unit is highly related to another unit within the firm. Controlling for potential 
explanations that may be related to structural-economic and managerial-agency antecedents of 
divestiture, I conclude that managers may be delaying exit in order to maintain synergies 
between their business units. In a final test, however, I demonstrate that these “synergistic” 
cross-subsidizations are not associated with increased performance at the firm-level. 
 These results suggest that managers are overestimating the potential for synergies as a 
basis for their internal investment decisions. Roll (1986) draws a similar conclusion in his 
investigation of corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). He defines the hubris hypothesis as 
the willingness of bidders to pay more than market price for acquisitions, primarily because they 
believe in potential synergies. The ex-post empirical evidence demonstrates that synergies often 
fail to generate value, and that acquiring firms, on average, pay too much for their targets. One 
explanation for this evidence is the inherent information asymmetry in the M&A setting. The 
bidder must derive a value for the target based on incomplete information, incorporating the 
                                                 
33 I am thankful to Professor Bryce for making the full dataset of relatedness percentiles and z-scores available to 
me. 
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“estimated economies due to synergy” (Roll 1986, 199), and these estimates can ultimately lead 
to valuation error and takeover premiums. The problem of information asymmetry, however, 
should be significantly less prominent for the internal investment decisions studied in this paper, 
so the prevalence of inefficient cross-subsidizations is particularly striking here. 
 The remainder of this paper is as follows. I begin by summarizing the antecedents of 
divestiture from prior literature and then introduce a theoretical background of exit delay. Next, I 
describe my sample and empirical approach, before presenting the main results. I conclude in the 
final section. 
 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
Divestitures include the spin-offs, carve-outs, sell-offs, and shuttering of individual business 
units by conglomerate firms. Regardless of their size and scope, divestitures constitute “a crucial 
element in the continuum of governance modes” for all firms (Lee and Madhavan 2010, 1345).  
Yet, as described above, firms repeatedly delay exit. To understand the potential drivers of the 
seemingly-inefficient exit delay documented in the academic and practitioner literature, I build 
on Porter (1976) to classify the antecedents of divestiture within three theoretical constructs: 
structural-economic; managerial-agency; and strategic. These antecedents form the basis for the 
examination of delayed exit, and I will now review each in turn. 
 
Structural-economic 
 Structural-economic factors comprise the economic characteristics of an industry or 
macroeconomic environment that may compel a conglomerate to delay exit, even when the 
business unit is earning a rate of return below its cost of capital. Two prominent factors in the 
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divestiture literature are environmental uncertainty and technological change. Damaraju, Barney, 
and Makhija (2011) consider the decision to divest from the perspective of real options theory 
(Tong and Reuer 2007) and hypothesize that environmental uncertainty increases the value of 
real options for divestiture. In this case, it may be optimal to retain a business unit when the 
current value of that unit is unknown (Li et al. 2007). Under conditions of high uncertainty, they 
find supporting empirical evidence that firms are more likely to delay exit. On the other hand, 
Bergh and Lawless (1998) hypothesize that firms may be more likely to divest under conditions 
of environmental uncertainty because they are unable to effectively manage their diverse 
business units. Using a measure of uncertainty based on the volatility of industry sales, they 
conclude that divestitures are sensitive to environmental uncertainty for the highly diversified 
firms in their sample. Similarly, Chatterjee, Harrison, and Bergh (2003) and Bergh (1998) find 
that environmental uncertainty spurs divestment activity, which in turn affects firm performance. 
Technological change can also influence divestment decisions. If firms fail to keep pace with 
either operating efficiencies or innovative developments, they may face higher rates of 
obsolescence, and thus be forced to exit sooner, when technological change is high (Harrigan 
1982; Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994).34 This effect is not always consistent, though, because 
high technological change in the form of environmental turbulence can enhance firm competence 
and result in a decision to delay exit (Tushman and Anderson 1986). 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Other industry-specific antecedents of divestiture, such as industry concentration and growth, business lifecycle 
and competitive intensity, come from the fields of industrial economics and organizational ecology (e.g., 
Ilmakunnas and Topi 1999). Brauer (2006) summarizes these factors and concludes that they are considered less 
important for divestment research today. 
49 
Managerial-agency 
 Managerial-agency factors are characterized by principal-agent theory, where delayed 
exit may be exacerbated by ineffective corporate governance and misaligned managerial 
incentives. According to an agency theory of investment, managers have incentives to diversify 
because growth increases their power (Jensen 1986). Effective corporate governance, then, is 
necessary to limit managerial malfeasance by aligning incentives between the internal and 
external capital markets (Walsh and Seward 1990). To be sure, weak internal governance is often 
blamed for overdiversification in the first place (e.g., Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt 1993; 
Hoskisson and Turk 1990; Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel 1994), where overdiversification is 
defined as growth beyond the optimal level for shareholders (Markides 1992). To cite one 
example in particular, Hoskisson and Turk (1990) find that poor corporate monitoring and 
inadequate compensation schemes lead to higher levels of product-market diversification.35 
Behavioral biases need also be curbed by corporate governance, lest managers delay exit either 
as a result of their unwillingness to admit past investment mistakes (Ravenscraft and Scherer 
1987; Boot 1992) or their escalation of commitment to an underperforming business unit (Staw 
1981; Ross and Staw 1993). 
 
Strategic 
 Strategic antecedents of divestiture are primarily concerned with the interrelatedness of 
the various businesses within the conglomerate firm. According to Teece’s (1982) economic 
                                                 
35 The finance literature also examines the value-reducing effects of overdiversification. Lang and Stulz (1994), for 
example, show that Tobin’s q and diversification are negatively related, suggesting that firms are overdiversifed. 
Similarly, Berger and Ofek (1995) find evidence that diversified firms have values that average approximately 15% 
below the sum of the imputed values of the individual business units. In more recent work, Hoechle, Schmid, 
Walter, and Yermack (2012) conclude that this “diversification discount” is at least in part the consequence of 
agency problems and poor corporate governance. 
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theory of the multiproduct firm, managers should allocate internal capital resources toward 
businesses that are related functionally, technologically, or geographically, i.e., toward 
investment opportunities where the managers exhibit a relative advantage based on tacit yet 
transferable organization knowledge. 
 Empirically, the results are decidedly mixed. Consistent with theory, some research finds 
that acquisitions of unrelated business units underperform (Chatterjee 1986; Chatterjee 1992; 
Singh and Montgomery 1987) and are subsequently divested (Duhaime and Grant 1984; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987).36 Likewise, refocusing on the core business of the firm by 
reducing the level of unrelated diversification tends to increase market value (Markides 1992; 
Markides 1995). Other studies, however, find that related acquisitions do not create more value 
than unrelated ones (Lubatkin 1987; Seth 1990; Matsusaka 1993), and that the outperformance 
observed in other settings may be a function of market structure as opposed to the relatedness of 
the diversification (Christensen and Montgomery 1981). Issues of relatedness measurement are 
also important (Robins and Wiersema 2003). Another explanation for these mixed results may 
also be the important distinction between the concepts of relatedness (i.e., the similarity between 
firms) and complementarity (i.e., the valuable combination of differences between firms), in 
particular when considering strategic and market factors (Harrison et al. 1991; Kim and 
Finkelstein 2009). 
 The research examining relatedness and exit also finds mixed results (Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1991; Kaplan and Weisbach 1992; Sharma and Kesner 1996; Chang and Singh 1999; 
Shimizu 2007; O’Brien and Folta 2009). In a meta-analysis, Lee and Madhavan (2010) find no 
statistically significant evidence that relatedness acts as a moderator between divestiture and 
                                                 
36 An important component of diversification and divestiture is also the origin of the business unit in question, e.g., 
whether it was developed internally or acquired (Karim 2006; Karim 2009). 
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subsequent performance. To explain these contradictory results, Lee, Folta, and Lieberman 
(2012) contend that relatedness can simultaneously both enhance the chance of survival (via 
synergies) and increase the rate of exit (via the ability to redeploy resources). None of these 
studies, however, examines the role of strategic relatedness within the context of delayed exit 
decisions, which is an important contribution of this paper.  
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The foundation of divestiture research is naturally rooted in the economics of acquisitions and 
diversification. Since at least Penrose (1959), scholars have recognized that economies of scale 
and scope can foster sustained competitive advantage for conglomerate firms. Management seeks 
to fully employ its indivisible resources as a “jig-saw puzzle,” where the relevant pieces include 
products, markets, and production technologies (Penrose 1959, 69). More formally, firms 
efficiently diversify via economies of scope when the joint production of two or more outputs is 
less than the cost of producing each separately (Panzar and Willig 1981). These unit-cost 
economies are only valuable for conglomerates when managers utilize proprietary knowhow 
(i.e., organization knowledge) across indivisible and specialized assets for production (Teece 
1980). Further, it is in related lines of business where these economies of scope are likely to be 
maximized, in part due to the commonality of knowhow and assets across businesses (Teece 
1982).37  
 An assumption underlying much of the early empirical research on divestitures is that 
exiting a business unit implies the management team made an investment mistake (Boot 1992). 
As noted in Brauer (2006), though, recent practitioner surveys indicate that senior managers 
                                                 
37 Teece (1982) does point out that unrelated diversification may be valuable when the conglomerate’s internal 
capital market can assess and select efficient investment opportunities (Williamson 1975).  
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consistently view divestitures as purposeful and strategic options, and as deliberate means to 
enhance firm value (KPMG 2002; Accenture 2003).38 By creating more efficient uses of firm 
resources, and by enabling the firm to regain competitiveness, divestitures can be a critical part 
of strategic growth for conglomerate firms (Berry 2009). Indeed, just as divestiture can be seen 
as a strategic option, so too can the decision to delay divestiture. Divesting business units that 
possess valuable yet tacit resources, such as those found in legacy lines of business, may even 
impair operating performance if managers do not accurately assess the interrelatedness of the 
divested unit to the rest of the firm (Feldman 2011). Firms may also delay divestiture if 
diversification is undertaken as a process of searching for valuable matches between related 
resources, and the uncertainty of this experimentation takes time for management to resolve 
(Matsusaka 2001). 
  Business-unit synergies may motivate a rational decision to delay exit and can take on 
two different forms. In the first type of synergy, scale/scope economies result when business 
units share a common resource whose unit-cost decreases with scale. Accordingly, marginal cost 
in the primary business unit would increase following a divestiture of the related unit. An 
alternative form of synergy is demand complementarity, where revenues for one business will 
increase when revenues increase in a related unit.39 In both cases, the decision to delay exit may 
ultimately be profit maximizing. By cross-subsidizing the underperforming business unit, the 
firm is in effect maintaining the synergistic relationship to the benefit of the firm as a whole. 
                                                 
38 An academic survey of CEOs by Hamilton and Chow (1993) finds that the desire to reverse management’s 
investment mistakes was only the 10th-ranked motive for the decision to divest. Other important motives for 
divestiture include the desire to focus on core business activities (2nd-ranked), the desire to shift resources to 
business units with higher growth opportunities (5th-ranked), and a desire to avoid the high investment needs of the 
divested business unit (9th-ranked). 
39 The methods based on relatedness in this paper will pick up effects from the first form (scale/scope economies) 
but may miss effects from the second (complementarities) if no other firms within the interrelatedness index also 
exhibit the exact nature of the complementarity. 
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  Where no synergies exists, Brauer and Wiersema (2012, 1474) succinctly capture the 
economic importance of the efficient divestment of underperforming business units: “According 
to transaction costs economics and resource-based theory, divestitures can result in better 
resource utilization and the removal of negative synergies or diseconomies of scale and scope 
across the firm’s portfolio, thus leading to value creation.” The decision to delay exit, then, has 
significant economic implications. In this paper, I examine cases where firms delay exit from 
underperforming business units and investigate whether business-unit synergies provide a 
strategic rationale for these seemingly inefficient capital allocation decisions. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research setting 
 For the conglomerate firm, the decision to divest a business unit is conducted by top 
management within the context of an “internal capital market,” where business-unit managers 
compete for firm investment (Chandler 1962; Williamson 1970). Research in strategic 
management recognizes the importance of a strategic allocation process for the efficient 
allocation of these scarce resources (Williamson 1975; Bower 1970; Lippman and Rumelt 
2003).40 While some strategy authors in the divestment literature address this link (e.g., 
Hoskisson and Turk 1990; Liebeskind 2000), the bulk of empirical work on allocation efficiency 
at the business unit-level has been carried out in the financial economics literature (see Stein 
2003 for a comprehensive review). The overwhelming conclusion from this research is that firms 
do not allocate capital efficiently (e.g., Lamont 1997; Shin and Stulz 1998; Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003; Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru 2007; Ozbas and Scharfstein 
                                                 
40 Chandler (1962, 16) defines strategy in terms of the resource allocation process: “Strategy can be defined as the 
determination of the basic long-term goals” of the firm, as well as “the allocation of resources necessary for carrying 
out these goals.”  
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2010). By connecting these two literatures explicitly, the research setting in this paper allows me 
to investigate the capital allocation decisions for each business unit at a micro-level. Within the 
internal capital market of the firm, I am able to examine when managers choose to cross-
subsidize underperforming business units, i.e., the actual decisions that result in delayed exit. 
 
Sample and data 
 The sample includes all publicly-traded firms in the Compustat Segment database from 
1979 to 2009. Following prior literature (e.g., Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000; Billett and 
Mauer 2003) and the approach developed in Vieregger (2012), each unit is categorized along two 
dimensions: profitability (ROA) and investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q). If the ROA (Tobin’s 
Q) is higher than the asset-weighted average ROA (Tobin’s Q) for the rest of the firm (i.e., all 
business units not including the focal unit), the unit is classified as having high performance 
(high investment opportunities). Likewise, a business unit has low performance (investment 
opportunities) when its ROA (Tobin’s Q) is lower than the asset-weighted ROA (Tobin’s Q) of 
the rest of the firm. To identify the relatively worst performing business units for use in this 
paper, I focus on the subsample of units that simultaneously have a lower ROA and a lower 
Tobin’s Q than the rest of the firm. 
 Next, I identify whether the business unit is being cross-subsidized by the firm’s internal 
capital market. By directly examining the cash flows and capital expenditures at the business-
unit level, a business unit is being cross-subsidized when its capital expenditures exceed the 
amount of its internally generated cash flow. These business units require additional cash flow 
from the firm’s internal capital market to fund their investment needs. Because business units 
with simultaneously low ROA and low Tobin’s Q are the relatively worst performing in the firm, 
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they do not represent a compelling source for profitable investments. As such, providing cash 
flow subsidies to these segments is considered inefficient, and a repeated pattern of cross-
subsidization implies a management decision to delay exit.41 
 For a business unit to be included in the final sample for this paper, I require it to be both 
underperforming and cross-subsidized for at least two consecutive years. Firms may engage in 
diversification as a search process that requires experimentation (i.e., entering new lines of 
business and observing the results) to resolve uncertainty (Matsusaka 2001). This 
experimentation may take the form of cross-subsidizing an underperforming business unit in the 
short-run, because management needs time to assess the value of its investment decision. By 
repeatedly deciding to cross-subsidize that unit, however, I assume that management is no longer 
“searching,” but is instead investing in the underperforming business unit for other reasons, 
either rational or not. Figure 1 depicts the timeline of data events for the sample, resulting in 
11,128 business unit-year observations. 
 Table 1 characterizes the level of investment and divestiture behavior of the full sample.42 
As indicated above, each business unit is categorized based on its ROA and Tobin’s Q, in 
addition to whether it is being cross-subsidized. The transition matrix here presents the 
probabilities that any one investment type will transition from one state to another, from one year 
to the next, where the rows indicate the number and percentage for each type of transition. As 
can be seen along the diagonal of the matrix, the most likely outcome for any investment type is 
to perpetuate it. This effect is most-pronounced for cross-subsidizing the worst underperforming 
                                                 
41 It is important to emphasize that all investments in these relatively worst performing business units are not 
necessarily considered inefficient. As long as they do not require cross-subsidizations, these business units, while 
underperforming, are still generating net positive cash flow for the rest of the firm. These investment decisions are 
thus considered efficient. 
42 The full sample from 1979 to 2009, before sorting based on the relative ROA and Tobin’s Q, is comprised of 
89,468 business unit-year observations, where 25,498 (28.8%) are both underperforming and cross-subsidized for at 
least one year during the sample period. 
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(LQ-LR Sub = 47.7%) and not subsidizing the best overperforming (HQ-HR = 51.8%) 
categories; the probability that other investment types persist is between 19.9% and 35.2%. 
Nearly half of the time, a firm that cross-subsidizes an underperforming business unit will repeat 
that investment during the next year.43 By itself, the fact that investments in the worst 
underperforming units are as likely to persist as investments in much better performing ones (and 
more likely than all others) is compelling. It is precisely these investments that I examine in the 
remaining empirics. 
 
Estimation approach 
 I implement a competing hazards model to estimate the instantaneous probability of exit, 
given that either (i) no exit has occurred or that (ii) the firm has not decided to re-allocate its 
capital resources.44 Traditional hazard analysis, as used in prior literature, would only estimate 
the probability of exit under the (false) assumption that firms do not change their allocation 
decisions from one period to the next. Within the context of an internal capital market, however, 
a firm can decide to reduce its investment in an underperforming business unit, such that the 
business unit is no longer being cross-subsidized.45 In this case, it is no longer as critical for the 
firm to consider exiting the unit, even if the unit continues to be underperforming, because it is 
now generating net positive cash flows. While the traditional hazard model would conflate both 
exiting and re-allocating as the same event, a competing hazards model can capture the 
alternative event of re-allocating resources away from the underperforming business unit. 
                                                 
43 It is also interesting to note that the probability of exiting the worst underperforming investments is not 
significantly higher than exiting any other, better-performing investment; the probability of exit for all units, 
regardless of performance or investment opportunities, is approximately between 21% and 23%. 
44 In STATA, competing hazards analysis is carried out with the -stcrreg- command. As of version 11.1, the 
command did not offer an option to fit the model in the accelerated failure-time (AFT) method. 
45 The performance of the business unit could also improve. 
57 
 Formally, the model estimates the competing hazard rates of whether the firm exits the 
business unit or efficiently alters its investment decision via the re-allocation of capital. The 
instantaneous transition rate is defined as: 
           
0
)(
→∆
= imltrk  
,|),(Pr(
t
tTkDttTt
∆
≥=∆+<≤
 
where k refers to either exit or re-allocation as outcomes in D. The decision to exit is the focal 
event; re-allocation is the competing event. The probability Pr describes the likelihood of 
experiencing one of the mutually exclusive outcomes during the time interval from t to (t + ∆t), 
conditional on still being at risk, where T is the total time at risk. Similar to standard survival 
analysis, each transition rate is specified using the Cox proportional hazard model: 
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where X is my vector of covariates, which are described in detail in the next section. To interpret 
the results, a positive (negative) coefficient on the estimated parameter β means that the variable 
of interest leads to a faster (slower) occurrence of the focal event, which in this case is exit. If 
relatedness is a strategic rationale for delayed exit, I would expect to find a negative coefficient 
on my proxy for synergy, i.e., where higher relatedness delays exit. 
 
Variables 
 To test the proposition that firms may have a strategic rationale for delaying exit, I make 
use of the Bryce and Winter (2009) interindustry relatedness index to develop my proxy for 
strategic relatedness.46 The index provides a percentile relatedness rank for every possible dyad 
                                                 
46 In their original research, Bryce and Winter (2009) demonstrate the construct validity of their interindustry 
relatedness index for manufacturing firms; I find consistent results in this paper using both their full sample and a 
manufacturing sample. 
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of business units based on 4-digit SIC industries, calculated as the likelihood distance between 
two different units. To construct my measure of strategic relatedness, I compare the dyad score 
of the underperforming business unit against each of the other business units within the firm, and 
I record the highest dyad score for the unit. This measure captures the maximum level of unit-to-
unit relatedness for that firm’s underperforming business unit, which I then use as my proxy for 
synergy between units. The key advantage of this measure is that it is based on the strategic 
relatedness of business units (Markides and Williamson 1994).47 
 To control for other potential drivers of (and barriers to) divestiture, I include measures 
for the structural-economic and managerial-agency antecedents, as discussed in the theory 
section above. For structural-economic factors, I follow Bergh and Lawless (1998) and Bergh 
(1998) in constructing a proxy for environmental uncertainty, measured as the 5-year volatility of 
industry-wide sales for each firm (Snyder and Glueck 1982). To control for technological change 
related to process efficiency improvements, I follow Harrigan (1982) in calculating a 
technological scale effect as the ratio of gross PP&E to the number of employees. Firms that 
cannot match increases in scale will face unit-cost disadvantages and be expected to divest their 
underperforming business units sooner. To capture the role of innovative technological changes, 
I also control for industry-adjusted R&D intensity, measured as R&D over sales less the 
corresponding 2-digit SIC mean. 
 Managerial-agency variables for the monitoring and control of managers imply that 
weaker governance structures result in greater agency problems (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker 1999). These control variables include board size, where a larger board is considered 
less effective (Jensen and Yermack 1996); the proportion of independent directors as a proxy for 
                                                 
47 In a robustness check on the measure of relatedness, discussed in the results section, I also examine the 
relationship between the business unit and the core business of the firm as a whole. The results from these tests are 
inconsistent, providing further support for the use of Bryce and Winter’s (2009) strategic measure of relatedness.  
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board independence (e.g., Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Yermack 1996; 
Pfeffer 1989); and the separation of Board Chairman and CEO to measure the level of CEO 
influence on the board. Managerial-agency variables for the incentive alignment between 
managers and shareholders also aim to decrease agency effects. These control variables include 
the percentage of long-term compensation for the CEO (e.g., Anderson, Bates, Bizzok, and 
Lemmon 2000) and CEO tenure, which can either proxy for CEO entrenchment or the likelihood 
that a new CEO will exit the underperforming businesses previously favored by a predecessor. 
 I also include financial control variables for the return on assets (ROA) of both the 
business unit and firm, because prior research has shown that each is an important antecedent of 
divestiture (Dranikoff et al. 2002; Duhaime and Grant 1984; Harrigan 1981; 1982; Markides 
1992; Montgomery and Thomas 1988; Pashley and Philippatos 1990; Chang 1996; Duhaime and 
Grant 1984; Hamilton and Chow 1993; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel 1996; Hoskisson 
and Johnson 1992). The control variables are developed from various databases, including 
ExecuComp (1992-2009), the RiskMetrics Directors File (1996-2006), and Thompson 
Financial/CDA Specturum. Once all controls are included, the subsample from 1996 to 2006 
includes a total of 629 unique business units, with 272 exit events and 175 re-allocation events.48 
The large number of re-allocation events provides further support for the importance of using a 
competing hazards model in this analysis. Because these subjects are considered over time, these 
units combine for 1,344 business unit-years at risk. Table 2 lists the univariate statistics and 
correlations of the variables. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 The remaining 182 subjects are right-censored. 
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RESULTS 
 When all controls are included in Model 3 of Table 3, the coefficient on the maximum 
relatedness variable of BWI Max Relatedness is –1.181, and it is highly significant. Because the 
dependent variable is probability of exit, the interpretation of the result is that the likelihood of 
exiting the underperforming business unit decreases as its maximum relatedness to other 
business units increases. Greater relatedness between business units leads to more, repeated 
cross-subsidizing of underperforming business units. An increase of one standard deviation in 
the level of relatedness decreases the likelihood of exiting that business unit in the next period by 
7.5%. The coefficients for the structural-economic and managerial-agency antecedents are 
generally insignificant but still consistent with expectations of divestiture theory. Firm-level 
ROA and business unit-level ROA are both negative and significant as expected; firms delay exit 
as performance increases. Introducing controls for divestiture antecedents limits the sample 
period to years 1996-2006, so Model 4 estimates the BWI Max Relatedness measure without 
controls for the years 1980-2009. The relatedness coefficient is smaller but still negative and 
highly significant.  
 
Are these investments efficient? 
 The very premise of this analysis is that repeatedly cross-subsidizing the firm’s worst 
underperforming business units is an inefficient investment decision. However, given that these 
investments appear to be supported by a strategic rationale related to business unit synergy, it is 
possible that classifying the investment decision as inefficient would be a mistake. By cross-
subsidizing the underperforming business unit, firms may in fact be contributing synergies to 
other business units, either by lowering the scale economies of shared resources or by increasing 
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demand complementarities. In this case, making repeated cross-subsidizing investments would 
not be a case of delayed exit but would instead be profit maximizing. 
 To examine the overall effectiveness of these investment decisions, I extend the analysis 
in Vieregger (2012) by establishing a counterfactual investment efficiency schema. In the 
original schema, each business unit within the conglomerate firm is categorized as either 
efficient or inefficient, based on its current performance (ROA) and growth opportunities 
(Tobin’s Q), as well as whether it is being cross-subsidized (i.e., its capital expenditures exceed 
its internally generated cash flow) via the internal capital market of the firm. As described above 
in the Sample section, a business unit has either high or low performance and high or low growth 
opportunities, relative to whether its ROA or Tobin’s Q is higher or lower than the weighted-
asset average of the rest of the firm. Subsidizing business units is inefficient when they have high 
ROA-high Q, high ROA-low Q, and low ROA-low Q (as in the sample of this paper). Under the 
counterfactual schema, I instead assume that cross-subsidization is actually an efficient allocation 
of capital resources when the low ROA-low Q business unit is highly related to another within 
the firm (see Figure 2). In the results reported here, highly related is defined as a Max 
Relatedness BWI score that is greater than the median.49 The remainder of the new schema 
follows Vieregger (2012) in every other way, such that I am isolating the decision to cross-
subsidize these relatively worst performing business units. 
 Next, I follow Rajan et al. (2000) to calculate the firm’s value-added from capital 
allocation in each year, which captures the overall efficiency of the internal capital market: 
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49 Robustness checks not tabulated here show that increasing or decreasing the cut-off criterion for highly related 
does not affect the tenor of the results. 
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For each business unit, the value-added measure calculates the amount (Amounti,t) of the cross-
subsidy or transfer (i.e., the amount that cash flow exceeds capital expenditures), weighted by the 
relative ROA of the focal unit (ROAi,t – ROA-i,t) and scaled by firm total assets (TotalAssetsi,t).
50 
Finally, the firm-level measure is the sum of all business-unit measures, where the value-added 
of inefficient business units is multiplied by negative one (–1), because these managerial 
decisions are not value enhancing. I calculate the value-added for each firm in each year, both for 
the original schema in Vieregger (2012) and the counterfactual schema based on efficient 
synergistic investments in this paper. The two measures will thus only vary when the firm makes 
a cross-subsidizing investment in a highly related business unit. 
 Model 1 in Table 3 matches the results first reported in Vieregger (2012), where the firm-
level measure of value-added is positively and significantly associated with market value.51 
Firms that follow the original schema appear to be enhancing firm value. If, on the other hand, 
firms are enhancing value by cross-subsidizing their underperforming but related business units, 
I would expect the coefficient in Model 2 of Table 3 to be significantly greater than that from the 
original schema. Instead, Model 2 shows that the coefficient on the value-added measure from 
the counterfactual schema is smaller (0.014) and no longer significantly associated with market 
value. These results suggest that, while firms may indeed be following a strategic rationale when 
making these cross-subsidizing investment decisions, the decisions themselves do not appear to 
enhance firm performance. Cross-subsidizing these underperforming business units via an 
internal capital market is in fact inefficient. 
 
 
                                                 
50 Weighting by ROA controls for the economic magnitude of the cross-subsidy or transfer. 
51 Robustness checks show that value-added is also strongly associated with other measures of performance, such as 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
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What is driving these inefficient investments? 
 Additional analysis suggests that the inefficient pattern of cross-subsidizations observed 
in this paper reflects an escalation of managerial commitment to the underperforming business 
unit (Staw 1976; Staw and Ross 1978). Recall that business unit-observations enter the sample of 
delayed exit when a firm makes two consecutive cross-subsidizing investments in one of its 
relatively worst underperforming units. To test the likelihood of entering into this sample, I 
create a binary variable that captures whether a firm decides to initiate the cross-subsidization of 
an underperforming business unit. The variable is set equal to one (1) if the business unit is 
underperforming and the firm initially decides to cross-subsidize it; if the firm decides to not 
cross-subsidize an underperforming business unit, the binary variable is set equal to zero (0). 
Using this binary variable of the decision to initiate cross-subsidization as the dependent 
variable, Table 5 shows the probit analysis including all controls for the 1996-2006 sample, 
matching the competing hazards model above. The coefficient on BWI Max Relatedness is not 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that relatedness does not influence the firm’s 
likelihood of entering into a cross-subsidizing and underperforming investment.52 The only 
significant coefficient is on the ROA of the business unit, which is highly negative as expected; 
the lower the ROA of the unit, the less likely is the firm to subsidize it. 
 These results are interesting because my proxy for synergy appears to play an 
asymmetrical role in the investment decision. Faced with the decision of whether to cross-
subsidize an underperforming business unit, the firm is not motivated by the relatedness of the 
unit in initiating the investment (i.e., making it for the first time); however, given that a cross-
subsidizing investment has been made for two consecutive years (as in the main result above), 
                                                 
52 If I eliminate the control variables to expand the sample size (not tabulated), the coefficient on BWI Max 
Relatedness becomes significantly negative, suggesting that increased synergy may actually decrease the likelihood 
of initiating an inefficient investment decision. 
64 
relatedness plays a highly significant role in continuing that investment. Once the firm has 
committed to the cross-subsidization of an underperforming business unit, it will escalate that 
inefficient investment for an average of another 5.6 years. 
 Further evidence suggesting an escalation of commitment to the underperforming 
business unit comes from the variable for CEO tenure, which is the only significant control in the 
original model from Table 3. A one standard deviation increase in the tenure of the CEO 
decreases the likelihood of exiting the underperforming business unit in the next period by 
almost 14%. In other words, newer CEOs are significantly more likely to exit underperforming 
businesses, suggesting that they are immune to any commitment that was previously driving the 
continuation of the inefficient investment. 
 To further test the role of CEO tenure in influencing an escalation of commitment, I use 
the Wilcoxon test to compare the survival functions of new CEOs against CEOs with longer 
tenure. The Wilcoxon test is a nonparametric rank test similar to the log-rank test, which 
tabulates the expected number of exits for each group and compares them against the observed 
number of exits.53 If new CEOs are more likely to exit underperforming business units, the 
Wilcoxon test should reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of the new CEOs is 
the same as that of longer-tenured CEOs. The results are consistent with these expectations. 
Whether CEOs are identified as “new” during their first year (Pr>chi2 = 0.0568) or during their 
first two years (Pr>chi2 = 0.0028), both tests demonstrate significantly different hazard functions 
across new and not-new CEOs. In other words, newer CEOs do not demonstrate a commitment 
to continue inefficient investments in underperforming business units. 
 
                                                 
53 The Wilcoxon test is constructed in the same way as the log-rank test, but I do not expect the hazard functions to 
vary proportionally over time, i.e., more firms will exit at earlier analysis times. The Wilcoxon test also assumes that 
the censoring patterns do not differ among the test groups. I achieve consistent results using both tests. 
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Robustness checks on relatedness 
 As a robustness check on the validity of the proxy for synergy employed for the main 
results of this paper, I follow prior convention in examining the relationship between the 
business unit’s industry and the core industry of the firm. I classify a business units as “core” if 
its segment SIC industry is the same as that of the primary SIC industry for the firm as a whole; I 
create three separate binary variables (one each for the 2-digit, 3-digit and 4-digit SIC industries) 
where the variable is equal to one (1) if the business unit shares the same SIC industry as the 
firm. If these SIC-based indicators are valid, I would expect the survivor functions of the core 
business units to vary significantly from those of the non-core units; similar to the results from 
the relatedness variable developed in this paper, I would expect firms to cross-subsidize the core 
business units longer than the non-core. 
 I formally test the equality of the survival function for the core versus non-core business 
units by using the Wilcoxon test, described above. If the SIC-based indicators for core business 
units are valid, the Wilcoxon test should reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of 
the core group is the same as the non-core group. However, the chi-squared from each of the 
three different SIC equality tests provides inconsistent results. Only the 2-digit SIC industry 
demonstrates significantly different hazard functions across core and non-core (Pr>chi2 = 
0.0003), while the tests for 3-digit (Pr>chi2 = 0.4930) and 4-digit (Pr>chi2 = 0.7863) are 
insignificant. These inconsistent results suggest that, only when core is broadly defined at the 2-
digit SIC industry, does it influence the cross-subsidization of underperforming business units. 
Finally, I also test the BWI Max Relatedness measure by comparing the survivor functions of 
units with high relatedness against those with low relatedness, based on median scores. 
Consistent with the conclusions in this paper, the chi-squared results indicate that the survival 
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function for highly related business units is significantly different from that of lowly related ones 
(Pr>chi2 = 0.0000). 
 In further checks (not tabulated here), I calculate the entropy measure of diversification, 
developed by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and Palepu (1985), and re-estimate the competing 
hazards model. I substitute the BWI Max Reldatedness variable with the three separate measures 
of entropy, total diversification (DT), related diversification (DR), and unrelated diversification 
(UR). While these measures are calculated at the level of the firm, and as such are not perfect 
substitutes for a business unit-level of synergy, they still represent traditional means to evaluate 
the diversification strategy of conglomerates. In my tests, none of the entropy coefficients are 
significant, but their signs were in expected directions. DT and DR were negative and 
insignificant, while DU was positive and insignificant; as the related diversification strategy of 
the firm increases, I would expect its likelihood of delayed exit to increase as well. 
 The insignificance of the entropy signs, as well as the inconsistent results from the SIC-
based hazard ratios for core/non-core business units, provide additional support for the proxy of 
synergy developed in this paper. The use of strategic measures of relatedness, such as one 
developed from the Bryce and Winter (2009) index, is critical when examining the strategic 
decision to delay exit. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Inefficient subsidies of underperforming business units represent the second-most persistent type 
of investment in firms, where the rate of persistence (48%) is nearly as high as that for efficient 
transfers from the high performing units (52%). This paper examines why firms are making such 
inefficient investments. I find first that a dominant rationale appears to be the relatedness 
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between business units. The main results from my proxy of business unit synergy indicate that 
the likelihood of exiting an underperforming business unit decreases as its maximum relatedness 
to other business units within the firm increases. One conclusion is that firms may believe that 
exiting these business units would result in increasing scale economies or decreasing 
complementarities, thus reducing market value. To examine whether firms may in fact be acting 
optimally by subsidizing these underperforming business units, I examine the impact on market 
value. The results for a counterfactual analysis, where these cross-subsidizing investments in 
highly related business units are considered efficient, does not find support for the idea that firms 
are creating value. Indeed, these subsidizing investments do appear to be inefficient. 
 This logic resembles Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis, where firms are overestimating the 
value of synergy in the mergers and acquisition (M&A) process. In the case of M&A activity, the 
hubris result is not necessarily surprising because a significant amount of information asymmetry 
can exist between the bidder and the target, leading to valuation errors. Within the internal 
capital market of a conglomerate firm, however, the result is indeed surprising. The firm should 
have access to detailed and accurate information on its business units and resources. They also 
have operating results. Additional tests on the decision to initiate a cross-subsidizing investment 
suggest that escalation of commitment may be driving these repeated, inefficient investment 
decisions.  
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Figure 1: Timeline of Data Events for the Sample 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Original and Counterfactual Schema for Underperforming Business Units 
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Table 1: Transition Probability Matrix from Year n to Year n+1 
Year n+1
Exit LQ-LR Sub LQ-HR Sub HQ-HR Sub HQ-LR Sub LQ-LR Trans LQ-HR Trans HQ-HR Trans HQ-LR Trans Total
(Inefficient) (Inefficient) (Inefficient) (Efficient) (Efficient) (Efficient) (Efficient) (Inefficient)
LQ-LR Sub 5,425 11,128 687 889 2,308 1,111 501 919 360 23,328
(Inefficient) 23.3 47.7 2.9 3.8 9.9 4.8 2.2 3.9 1.5 100.0
LQ-HR Sub 908 775 818 672 224 71 293 334 18 4,113
(Inefficient) 22.1 18.8 19.9 16.3 5.5 1.7 7.1 8.1 0.4 100.0
HQ-HR Sub 2,186 1,013 699 3,732 1,090 73 243 1,487 75 10,598
(Inefficient) 20.6 9.6 6.6 35.2 10.3 0.7 2.3 14.0 0.7 100.0
HQ-LR Sub 2,623 2,436 228 926 3,521 214 142 688 382 11,160
(Efficient) 23.5 21.8 2.0 8.3 31.6 1.9 1.3 6.2 3.4 100.0
Year n LQ-LR Trans 1,244 941 53 69 192 1,858 527 619 436 5,939
(Efficient) 21.0 15.8 0.9 1.2 3.2 31.3 8.9 10.4 7.3 100.0
LQ-HR Trans 1,433 516 355 274 155 410 1,896 1,743 122 6,904
(Efficient) 20.8 7.5 5.1 4.0 2.3 5.9 27.5 25.3 1.8 100.0
HQ-HR Trans 4,892 872 383 1,674 705 552 1,690 12,180 565 23,513
(Efficient) 20.8 3.7 1.6 7.1 3.0 2.4 7.2 51.8 2.4 100.0
HQ-LR Trans 725 312 33 69 328 455 137 632 785 3,476
(Inefficient) 20.9 9.0 1.0 2.0 9.4 13.1 3.9 18.2 22.6 100.0
Total 19,436 17,993 3,256 8,305 8,523 4,744 5,429 18,602 2,743 89,031
21.8 20.2 3.7 9.3 9.6 5.3 6.1 20.9 3.1 100.0  
 
The transition matrix presents the probabilities that any one investment type will transition from one state to another, from 
one year to the next, where the rows indicate the number and percentage for each type of transition. Business units are 
categorized based on their performance (ROA) and investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q) relative the asset-weighted amounts 
for the rest of the firm as a whole: L = low; H = high; Q = Tobin’s Q; R = ROA; Sub = Cross-subsidizing investment (where 
capital expenditure exceeds cash flow); Trans = Transferring (where cash flow exceeds capital expenditure).  
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Table 2: Data Summary and Correlations 
Obs Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Unit ROA (%) 1344 0.011 0.188 -3.310 0.462 1.000
2 Firm ROA (%) 1344 0.104 0.087 -0.352 0.866 0.151 1.000
3 Independent Directors (%) 1344 0.681 0.164 0.000 0.933 0.030 0.047 1.000
4 No. of Directors (log) 1344 2.294 0.234 1.386 3.219 0.103 -0.005 -0.006 1.000
5 CEO is Chairman 1344 0.206 0.405 0.000 1.000 -0.141 -0.015 -0.120 -0.138 1.000
6 CEO Tenure (log) 1344 8.266 0.675 4.277 9.978 -0.001 0.030 -0.211 -0.107 -0.152 1.000
7 CEO Long-term Incentives (%) 1344 0.372 0.288 0.000 1.000 0.051 0.197 0.160 0.085 -0.115 -0.119 1.000
8 R&D Intensity 1344 0.005 0.023 -0.268 0.073 0.033 -0.031 -0.027 -0.009 -0.077 0.029 -0.057 1.000
9 Technological Scale (log) 1344 5.075 1.276 1.210 8.839 -0.002 -0.102 0.054 0.189 0.004 0.005 0.025 -0.033 1.000
10 Max Relatedness 1344 0.146 0.054 -1.284 0.182 0.043 -0.020 0.025 0.053 -0.034 -0.016 0.036 -0.002 -0.037 1.000  
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Table 3: Competing Hazards Regression Analysis 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Focal Event: Exit Exit Exit Exit
Competing Event Re-allocation Re-allocation Re-allocation Re-allocation
BWI Max Relatedness (Synergy) -1.058*** -1.129*** -0.933***
(0.252) (0.383) (0.237)
Structural-Economic Controls
Environmental Uncertainty -0.359 -0.400
(0.435) (0.441)
Technological Scale 0.045 0.045
(0.055) (0.055)
Industry-Adusted R&D Intensity -2.672 -2.819
(2.317) (2.341)
Managerial-Agency Controls
Board Size 0.094 0.093
(0.292) (0.290)
Independent Directors -0.178 -0.131
(0.370) (0.375)
CEO is Board Chairman 0.031 0.011
(0.162) (0.164)
CEO Long-term Compensation 0.236 0.233
(0.239) (0.239)
CEO Tenure -0.174** -0.171*
(0.087) (0.087)
Firm-level ROA -1.034 -1.072
(0.719) (0.724)
Business Unit-Level ROA -0.949*** -0.937***
(0.179) (0.179)
Calendar-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Subjects 629 629 629 4716
No. of Exit Events 272 272 272 2781
No. of Competing Events (Re-allocation) 175 175 175 1316
No. Censored 182 182 182 619
Observations 1344 1344 1344 15233
Time-at-Risk 1344 1344 1344 15233
Log Pseudolikelihood -1309.23 -1321.29 -1308.13 -21270.62
Wald chi2 134.43 97.49 142.66 685.63
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Comparison Between Original and Counterfactual Schemas 
Dependent Variable = Log of Firm Market Value
Original Revised
Schema Schema
[1] [2]
Value-Added 0.278** 0.014
(0.128) (0.057)
Controls Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Constant 2.141*** 2.146***
(0.198) (0.198)
N 30209 30209
R
2
0.436 0.435
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  
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Table 5: Probit Analysis 
Dependent Variable = Initiating Investment
BWI Max Relatedness (Synergy) -0.368
(0.556)
Structural-Economic Controls
Environmental Uncertainty -0.377
(0.253)
Technological Scale 0.034
(0.034)
Industry-Adusted R&D Intensity 2.023
(1.469)
Managerial-Agency Controls
Board Size -0.118
(0.163)
Independent Directors -0.096
(0.274)
CEO is Board Chairman -0.049
(0.102)
CEO Long-term Compensation 0.070
(0.148)
CEO Tenure -0.039
(0.064)
Firm-level ROA 1.452
(1.120)
Business Unit-Level ROA -4.277***
(1.060)
Constant 1.419**
(0.719)
Observations 1339
Pseudo R2 0.0646
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Managerial Foresight and Corporate Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Managers generate value through the implementation of unique strategies. We argue that 
managers exhibit foresight when they make unique investment decisions today that deliver 
above-normal returns in the future. The main objectives of this paper are to define a theory of 
managerial foresight and to introduce a new measure that captures foresight. We also highlight 
the characteristics of managers and firms that appear to exhibit foresight.  
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“We’re happy to be once again a large owner of a business with both unique assets and 
outstanding management.” — Warren Buffett, 1995 Letter to Shareholders 
 
foresight (n): the ability to predict what will happen in the future; prescience 
 
1. Introduction 
Managers generate value through the implementation of unique strategies (Litov, Moreton, and 
Zenger 2012). Whether via the acquisition of new businesses, the construction of new plants, or 
the research and development of new drugs, all strategies that require the investment of capital 
resources are carried out within strategic factor markets (Barney 1986). These markets are 
necessarily imperfect, because managers faced with uncertainty and ambiguity will develop 
varying expectations about the future value of particular strategies (Demsetz 1973; Lippman and 
Rumelt 1982; Barney 1986; Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Indeed, some managers will exhibit 
foresight—the ability to make unique investments today that deliver above-normal returns in the 
future—by exploiting the imperfections in strategic factor markets. Leaving aside luck as an 
explanation, this foresight is primarily driven by the proprietary insights that managers possess 
about the firm’s accumulation of strategic capabilities and assets (Dierickx and Cool 1989), 
which can ultimately lead to the establishment of competitive advantages for the firm (Barney 
1991; Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 2005; Kunc and Morecroft 2010). This paper outlines a theory of 
managerial foresight and introduces a new measure to identify managers who exhibit this 
foresight.54 We contend that foresight leads to unique investment decisions, i.e., investments that 
                                                 
54 Ahuja et al. (2005, 793) have called for more research into the theory and empirics of managerial foresight: 
“Accordingly, the question of how much foresight managers actually have seems to be fairly important for the 
strategic management literature.” 
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are not immediately recognized by the firm’s competitors or the external capital market in 
general. It is these unique strategies that can generate above-normal returns. 
 
2. Setting 
The setting for our investigation of managerial foresight is the capital investment decisions of 
firms. A large and significant literature on the association between corporate investment and 
internal cash flow concludes that firms typically overinvest and may destroy value by doing so 
(see Stein 2003 for a review in the financial economics literature). Conversely, some firms 
exhibit what in retrospect appears to be foresight in their investment decisions. For example, 
Costco Wholesale Corp. made large investments in growth and expansion during the mid-1990s, 
investments that set the foundation of its profitable trajectory even through today. Other firms 
that made seemingly-large investment decisions during the mid-1990s include Circuit City 
Stores Inc., Target Corp., and Lowe’s Companies Inc.—all of which enjoyed stock market 
appreciation during the period. Appendix A provides a short analysis of managerial foresight in 
the retail industry starting in 1996. 
 In order to study managerial foresight, we need to provide a definition: managers with 
foresight make unique investment decisions today that deliver above-normal returns in the 
future. We operationalize uniqueness by examining the levels of investment which deviate from 
the expectations of the external capital market. The investigation of investment levels is 
important because the market often penalizes firms when they invest either too much (e.g., by 
overexpanding) or too little (e.g., by holding large cash reserves). An example of the former case 
comes from Amazon, which is constantly reinvesting significant sums of its retained earnings. 
Even after its Q3 2011 results were reported in line with market expectations, the company’s 
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stock was pounded after executives announced they would be investing more to support the long-
term growth prospects of the company.55 An example of the latter case is Apple. Management at 
Apple is often criticized (and is currently being sued) for not returning more of its cash hoard to 
investors.56 Because of this penalty for underinvesting and overinvesting, firms should only 
pursue investment levels that deviate from market expectations when they have a compelling 
strategic rationale for doing so. 
 Our definition of managerial foresight thus requires a theory of market expectations. 
Conceptually, we define underinvestment as investing less than an expected level, while 
overinvestment is investing more. Empirically, we employ residual analysis to measure 
investment deviation as a function of the market’s expectations of investment, derived from three 
components: the firm’s current investment level; its market-to-book ratio; and a market-based 
prediction of investment, which is derived from industry regression analyses. Other approaches 
to measure deviation include examining the level of investment greater than (or less than) an 
industry average (e.g., Campbell et al. 2011), or the use of proxies for managerial 
optimism/overconfidence, based on option holding or insider buying patterns (e.g., Malmendier 
and Tate 2005). We employ the residual approach because it enables us to make firm-level 
predictions of investment levels and calculate the deviation from expected levels directly.57 
 Some firms exhibiting foresight will deliver above-normal returns through competitive 
advantages because they possess and accurately utilize their proprietary information (Dierickx 
and Cool 1989; Barney 1991; Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 2005). This information allows managers to 
exploit imperfections in strategic factor markets by investing either less (underinvesting) or more 
                                                 
55 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/business/at-amazon-jeff-bezos-talks-long-term-and-means-
it.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
56 http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-26/too-much-cash-isnt-good-for-apple 
57 Some limitations of the approach are considered in the concluding section. 
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(overinvesting) than is currently expected by the external capital market (Demsetz 1973; 
Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Barney 1986; Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Underinvesting with 
foresight allows firms to avoid losses by abstaining from value-destroying investment 
opportunities, while overinvesting with foresight allows firms to more fully exploit growth 
opportunities. Because these investment levels are not anticipated by the external capital market, 
firms with foresight can earn above-normal returns from their more accurate expectations of 
return potential (Barney 1986).58 
 Distinguishing between foresight and luck within this context is critical yet perhaps 
empirically impossible: “Our guess is that whatever the formal approach, two of the ubiquitous 
tools in capital budgeting are a wing and a prayer, and serendipity is an important force in the 
outcome” (Fama and French 1997, 179). Barney (1986) also recognizes that the attainment of 
competitive advantages may merely be the result of a firm’s good fortune and luck. Indeed, 
without a theory of managerial foresight, the sources of competitive advantage would be 
indistinguishable from luck (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 2005). The preliminary approach presented in 
this paper makes no special claim to resolving the confounding factor of luck, but we do 
recognize its vital importance to the interpretation of our empirical design and results. 
 
2.1 Prior Empirical Literature 
Starting with Barney (1986), the establishment of competitive advantage has long relied on the 
theoretical concept of foresight. Despite this importance, scant research has attempted to identify 
cases of managerial foresight empirically. This section provides a brief overview of one 
empirical study related to our work here. 
                                                 
58 We employ industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) to proxy for returns. We will discuss the empirical approach 
and its limitations in the next section. 
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 Ahuja, Coff, and Lee (2005) examine whether managers have foresight to identify their 
key patents ex ante, and the authors look at insider trading patterns as a signal of this foresight. 
They point out that, while foresight is necessary for rent accumulation (absent luck), managers 
may use the information asymmetry inherent in this foresight to appropriate rents for themselves 
at the expense of shareholders. Empirically, they show that insider purchases by senior managers 
increase in the number of patents, as well as with patent activity in the year before, during, and 
after the patent application is filed. These results suggest that managers do exhibit foresight 
related to patents and that they trade on this proprietary information. Ahuja et al. (2005) do not, 
however, examine whether managers actually increase wealth as a result of their insider trades. 
 
3. Empirical Design 
The sample includes all firms from Compustat that make capital investments (capx) and have 
complete data for our analysis between 1996 and 2006.59 
 We employ residual analysis to categorize the investment decisions of firms based on 
their deviation from expectations of the external capital market (Richardson 2006; Biddle, 
Hilary, and Verdi 2009). Residual analysis enables us to capture firm-level deviations from the 
expected level of investment, which is estimated from a market-based regression model. The 
expected level of investment from this approach will vary over time and thus reflect the 
influence of industry-wide economic conditions during the year. 
 In the first step, we regress firm-level investment on the firm’s market-to-book ratio at 
the beginning of the period, which is our measure of the market’s expectation of the firm’s 
                                                 
59 Note that some of our analysis requires data in year t+3, so we also use forward data from 2007 to 2009 for return 
on assets (ROA).   
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investment opportunities.60 No other control variables are included in the first-stage regression 
because the impact of these effects will be investigated in the second stage.  
tititi dicatorIndustryIntorYearIndicaMTBI ,1,10, εββ ++++= ∑∑−  
 
I is firm i’s investment level (capx) scaled by the beginning assets in year t, and MTB is firm i’s 
market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the year. This first-stage regression is estimated cross-
sectionally for each industry-year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
classification.61 Each industry must have a minimum of 20 firm-year observations in each given 
year. Then, using the firm’s market-to-book ratio, we calculate the expected level of investment 
(I-hat) as a function of the estimated industry-year coefficient on MTB for each firm’s industry. 
)(ˆ 1,1,0, −∗+= tijti MTBI ββ  
 
And finally, the deviation from market expectations (i.e., the residual, I-tilda) is calculated as the 
difference between the firm’s actual level of investment during the year (I) and the predicted 
level (I-hat). 
tititi III ,,,
ˆ~ −=  
 
 To classify firms as either overinvesting or underinvesting, we split the sample of firms 
into quartiles based on the magnitudes of their residuals (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009). We 
sort firms yearly based on the residuals and classify the bottom (top) quartile as firms that are 
                                                 
60 Biddle et al. (2009) find consistent results when they use either Tobin’s Q or sales growth (both together and 
separately) as their proxy for investment opportunities in the market model.  
61 Fama and French (1997) start with 4-digit SIC industries and develop a classification system with 48 industries. 
One objective of the approach is to more accurately estimate the cost of equity for industries. The classification 
system is widely used in asset pricing, corporate finance, and economics. See Wulf (2002) for its use in the context 
of internal capital markets. 
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underinvesting (overinvesting), such that the most negative (positive) residuals are classified as 
underinvesting (overinvesting). The investment levels of firms within the two middle quartiles 
are considered to be consistent with the expectations of the capital market. This group constitutes 
the firms at the benchmark investing level. 
 In our preliminary analysis, we examine the profitability of the firm’s investment as a 
measure of the rents accruing to the firm, using industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) as the 
proxy. For each firm, we compare its industry-adjusted ROA during the year of investment 
against its industry-adjusted ROA three years hence. For a firm to exhibit above-normal returns, 
we require that the industry-adjusted ROA in t+3 is both positive (i.e., higher than the industry 
average for that year) and increasing (i.e., the firm’s ROA in t+3 is higher than its ROA in t).62 
 In our empirical design, then, managers exhibit foresight when the firm’s investment 
level deviates from market expectations (i.e., the firm is either underinvesting or overinvesting 
according to the market model) and its investments yield above-normal returns in the future (i.e., 
ex post future industry-adjusted ROA is both positive and increasing). We provide univariate 
summary statistics in the next section. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
A primary objective of this paper is to examine the prevalence of foresight and the characteristics 
of firms exhibiting such foresight. 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Of course, using ROA is not without concerns. Another approach to measure the above-normal returns of the firm 
might be its cumulative abnormal returns based on stock price. We discuss the advantages and limitations of both 
measures more fully in the concluding section of this paper. 
92 
4.1 Data Summary 
The full sample from 1996 to 2006, which is used in the first-stage regression to estimate 
industry-year levels of expected investment, is comprised of 75,163 firm-year observations (see 
Table 1). Our sample is further limited by the number of firms that do not contain data for ROA 
in t+3, so the main sample of analysis contains 54,573 firm-year observations.63 The annual 
number of firm-year observations is relatively stable throughout the ten-year sample period, and 
the individual years for 1996 and 2006, as well as for the retail industry (Fama-French industry 
42), are also presented in Table 1.64 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 Figure 1 depicts histograms of the residuals for various samples.65 The top two 
histograms show the distribution of residuals for the full years, separately, of 1996 and 2006. 
Both appear to be approximately normally distributed, although they also both exhibit a longer 
tail to the right. The value at the 99th percentile is farther away from zero than that of the 1st 
percentile (see Table 1). While the mean for each year is zero, the medians residuals for both 
years are negative. The bottom two histograms show the distribution of the retail industry (Fama-
French industry 42) in 1996 and 2006. Again, the distribution for the retail industry in 1996 
appears generally normal (with a longer tail to the left), but for 2006 the retail industry definitely 
                                                 
63 Firms that do not contain data in t+3 can be said to have “exited” the sample. These firms may exit for any 
number of reasons, which may be both positive or negative for the firms, and accretive or dilutive for shareholders. 
In subsequent tests, we will also consider the characteristics of these exiting firms. 
64 In the Appendix, we provide a short analysis of managerial foresight in the retail industry as of 1996. 
65 In all histograms, the data beyond the 1st and 99th percentiles have been removed for presentation purposes. I do 
not drop the outliers from the overall analysis because a test of deviation is in some ways an examination of outliers. 
Table 1 lists the 1st and 99th percentiles because they capture the general tenor of the data more accurately than the 
minimum and maximum values. 
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shows a block pattern distribution between -0.05 and -0.01. A large number of firms appear to be 
underinvesting in this particular industry-year sub-sample.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 To categorize firms as either underinvesting or overinvesting, the full sample is split into 
quartiles based on the magnitude of residuals. Firms are sorted annually; the bottom quartile (i.e., 
the most negative residuals) are the underinvesting firms and the top quartile (i.e., the most 
positive residuals) are the overinvesting firms. After splitting the sample based on quartiles, 
18,798 (25%) firms are categorized as underinvesting; 18,784 (25%) as overinvesting; and 
37,581 (50%) are considered to have investment levels consistent with market expectations (see 
Panel A of Table 2). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
From Table 1, we also see that the median residual for the full sample is -0.017, suggesting that 
on average firms appear to be underinvesting relative to market expectations. The residuals at the 
1st percentile (most negative) and 99th percentile (most positive) are -0.315 and 0.548. The 25th 
percentile-split for underinvesting comes at -0.040; the 75th percentile-split for overinvesting 
comes at 0.012. 
 Because we use a strict line to separate the sample into three groups, one concern is 
whether these categories are actually different from each other. In order to examine the sample 
mean between two or more groups, we use one-way analysis of variance with the Bonferroni 
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multiple-comparison test to reduce bias from multiple groups (see Table 3).66 The sample mean 
of the residual for the benchmark category (-0.02) is significantly larger (p=0.000) than the 
sample mean of the residual for the underinvesting category (-0.13). Likewise, the sample mean 
of the residual for the overinvesting category (0.16) is significantly larger (p=0.000) than the 
sample means for both the benchmark and the underinvesting categories. We conclude that the 
three categories of residuals capture distinct subsets of the data. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 As discussed above, we lose observations when determining managerial foresight 
because the analysis requires the firm to have ROA at t+3. As a result, we can categorize 
foresight for 54,573 firm-year observations (see Panel B of Table 2). Within this sample, the 
quartile split for deviation from expected levels of investment also changes, but only slightly. 
The middle two benchmark quartiles, which originally comprised 50%, now increases to 50.9% 
of the sample. The underinvesting category decreases to 23.5% of the sample, and 
overinvestment increases to 25.6%. It thus appears that underinvesting firms are slightly less 
likely to survive to t+3, while overinvesting firms are slightly more likely. We do not believe 
these changes introduce any significant bias into the results. Figure 2 presents some evidence as 
to why underinvesting firms are less likely to survive, as the median firm-level ROA at time t for 
the underinvesting firms that exit is negative and significantly smaller than all other categories. 
These underinvesting firms are already struggling with lower ROA at the start of the analysis 
period. For all of the exit categories, the firm-level median ROA is lower at the start of the 
analysis period. 
                                                 
66 The command for oneway analysis of variance in Stata is -oneway-. 
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--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 Within the sample as a whole (see Panel C of Table 2), which includes all firms that exit 
from the sample due to data limitations, we find that approximately 22.4% of the underinvesting 
firms exhibit foresight (2,877 firm-year observations out of 12,820) and 25.0% of overinvesting 
firms exhibit foresight (3,491 out of 13,960). We categorize about 3.8% of firms as 
underinvesting with foresight and 4.6% of firms as overinvesting with foresight; approximately 
8.4% of all firms are considered to be investing with managerial foresight, i.e., they are deviating 
from market expectations and experiencing above-normal future returns. 
 
4.2 Investment Deviation & Performance 
Prior literature typically concludes that underinvestment or overinvestment relative to some 
benchmark is not value-enhancing. However, if some managers are deviating from expected 
levels of investment based on proprietary information (i.e., they are investing with foresight), we 
might expect these deviations to yield above-normal returns. One way to examine the 
effectiveness of the investment decision is to evaluate the change in ROA after the decision has 
been made. 
 Figure 3 depicts the median firm-level ROA at years t and t+3 for each of the groups for 
underinvesting, benchmark, and overinvesting. The figure suggests that median ROA is lowest 
for the underinvesting group and highest for the overinvesting group, consistent with 
expectations. Firms with higher ROA are more likely to generate excess cash flow, which they 
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may then reinvest into the firm.67 It is also interesting that the median ROA in t+3 is lower than 
that for the benchmark and overinvesting firms, while it is slightly higher for underinvesting. 
These results may suggest a type of reversion to the mean in firm-level performance. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 Figure 4 provides a similar analysis for median ROA when we further separate the groups 
based on foresight. By construction, the median ROA in time t+3 is the highest for the two 
groups that are underinvesting with foresight (Under/Yes) and overinvesting with foresight 
(Over/Yes). What is interesting is that the underinvesting firms with foresight (Under/Yes) 
exhibit a significantly higher median ROA in time t than the underinvesting firms with no 
foresight (Under/No), suggesting that the firms with foresight have already attained defensible 
competitive advantages in some form. The same, however, is not true for the overinvesting firms. 
Overinvesting firms with foresight (Over/Yes) have approximately the same median ROA in 
time t than overinvesting firms with no foresight. This result suggests that the characteristics of 
overinvesting firms may play a pivotal role in whether they invest with foresight. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 Table 4 provides some preliminary evidence that the relationship between deviations 
from investment level and firm performance may be more nuanced than prior literature assumes. 
The table depicts a one-way analysis of variance test for the mean change in industry-adjusted 
ROA between year t and t+3. The mean change is simply the industry-adjusted ROA in year t+3 
                                                 
67 We will explore the idea of a cash flow effect more fully in the next two subsections. 
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less that from t, such that positive (negative) numbers indicate improvement (decline) in ROA. 
The results suggest that overinvesting firms, on average, actually have a significantly higher 
change in mean ROA than that of the benchmark category. Underinvesting firms, on the other 
hand, do not demonstrate any significant difference in their mean change in ROA relative to 
either overinvesting firms or the benchmark group. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.3 Managerial & Firm-level Characteristics 
We next employ tests of sample means to explore the characteristics of managers and firms that 
exhibit foresight. These tests compare the sample means across groups when there are more than 
two groups, and they provide univariate indications of what characteristics may influence firms 
to either underinvest or overinvest. The characteristics included in this preliminary analysis are: 
age of the CEO; current tenure of the CEO; whether the CEO is optimistic/overconfident; the 
percentage of independent directors on the corporate board; whether the firm contains multiple 
business units; and the amount of the firm’s cash flow. When we require each observation to 
have all managerial and firm-level characteristics, the sample size is reduced to 5,125 firm-year 
observations. 
 
4.3.1 Characteristics of Investment Deviation 
Panel A of Table 5 provides the split for the deviation from expected levels of investment within 
the characteristics sample of 5,125 firm-year observations. Recall that we split the full data 
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sample into quartiles, where the bottom (top) quartile is classified as underinvesting 
(overinvesting). Within the smaller sample here, only 16.1% of firms are classified as 
underinvesting, providing further evidence that these firms tend to exit the sample sooner due to 
lower performance. Overinvesting firms, on the other hand, still constitute 25.1% of the sample. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 Panel B of Table 5 summarizes the sample means and standard deviations for all of the 
characteristics variables. Sample means highlighted in bold are statistically different than the 
sample mean of the benchmark group. Appendix B provides the detail statistics for the one-way 
analysis of variance for each variable. 
 An interesting conclusion from the analysis of variance statistics is the tendency for the 
sample mean of the characteristics variables in the overinvesting group to be significantly 
different than the sample mean of the benchmark. For example, the CEO tenure of overinvesting 
firms is significantly longer than benchmark firms (p=0.004). Likewise, overinvesting firms, 
relative to the benchmark group, have more optimistic CEOs (p=0.000) and have a smaller 
percentage of independent directors (p=0.002). In other words, optimistic CEOs are more likely 
to overinvest, and the smaller percentage of independent directors suggests a reduced level of 
corporate control may play in role in enabling that overinvestment. 
 An interesting difference between underinvesting firms and overinvesting firms is the 
corporate structure, where underinvesting firms are significantly more likely to have multiple 
business units. The binary variable for the multisegment characteristic is set equal to 1 if the firm 
contains multiple business units. The sample mean for underinvesting firms is 0.34, which is 
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significantly larger than the overinvesting group (mean=0.27; p=0.001). The sample mean of 
overinvesting firms is also significantly smaller than the benchmark (p=0.005). 
 Consistent with prior literature, we also find strong evidence for a cash flow effect on 
investment. The sample mean of cash flow for overinvesting firms is significantly larger than 
that of underinvesting firms (p=0.000) and of the benchmark group (p=0.000). Likewise, the 
sample mean of underinvesting firms is significantly smaller that that of the benchmark 
(p=0.000). Firms with more cash flow tend to overinvest relative to a market-model benchmark, 
while firms with less cash underinvest. 
 
4.3.2 Characteristics of Managerial Foresight 
Panel A of Table 6 details the further breakdown of the smaller sample with managerial and 
firm-level characteristics (5,125 firm-year observations). Similar to Section 4.1 above, the 
underinvesting and overinvesting firms are further categorized as having foresight if they exhibit 
both positive and improving industry-adjusted ROA in t+3. Panel B of Table 6 is also analogous 
to Panel B of Table 5, where we provide sample means and standard deviations of the 
characteristics variables, which are split across groups based on investment deviation and 
industry-adjusted ROA performance. Appendix C provides details of the one-way analysis of 
variance statistics for the sample mean differences across the groups. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 Characteristics variables where the sample mean for the underinvesting group with 
declining ROA and the overinvesting group with declining ROA are both significantly different 
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from the benchmark group include CEO tenure, CEO optimism, the percentage of independent 
directors, and cash flow. Firms tend not to exhibit foresight when they have CEOs with longer 
tenures, CEOs who are more optimistic, where boards have fewer independent directors, and 
firms have more cash flow; these firms deviate from the benchmark investment levels and 
decrease their returns on investment by doing so. While the sample mean of CEO age is not 
significantly different for underinvesting or overinvesting firms, we do find that the sample mean 
of CEO age for overinvesting firms with increasing ROA is significantly higher than the 
benchmark group. 
 Our previous results show that optimistic CEOs tend to overinvest; in Panel B of Table 6 
we see that this result holds for firms that experience both decreasing and increasing ROA in t+3. 
However, the difference between the sample means of the decreasing and increasing groups is 
not significant. For overinvesting firms that experience declining ROA, the sample mean of CEO 
optimism is also significantly larger than both sub-groups of underinvesting firms. 
 In the broader sample from section 4.3.1, we find that underinvesting firms are 
significantly more likely to have multiple business units. In Panel B of Table 6, we see that the 
underinvesting firms with declining ROA have the largest sample mean, and this difference is 
significant larger than both sub-groups of overinvesting firms. The sample mean of 
underinvesting firms with increasing ROA is also significantly larger than that of overinvesting 
firms with decreasing ROA. 
 We also find further evidence for a cash flow effect on investing in these results. 
Overinvesting firms that experience decreasing ROA have a significantly larger sample mean of 
cash flow than both underinvesting sub-groups and the benchmark group. More important, the 
sample mean of cash flow for overinvesting firms that experience declining ROA is significantly 
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larger than the sample mean of overinvesting firms that experience increasing ROA. Not only 
does more cash flow lead to overinvesting, it tends to lead to overinvesting and 
underperformance. 
 
5. Multinomial Logit Results 
The summary statistics in Section 4 provide an interesting background on the nature of firms that 
underinvest and overinvest relative to a market-model benchmark. In this section, we extend the 
analysis to examine the likelihood of managerial foresight using a set of multinomial logit 
models. Essentially, the multinomial logit model estimates separate binary logit models for each 
pair of outcome categories separately. We use multinomial logit models because the outcomes 
are assumed to be nominal, i.e., unordered. 
 In the first test (see Table 7), we examine the likelihood that firms will either underinvest 
or overinvest, relative to the benchmark group. Similarly, the second test (see Table 8) examines 
the likelihood that firms will either underinvest or overinvest, while also examining the sub-
groups based on ROA performance in t+3. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 & Table 8 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 We will confine our discussion of the results to two of the control variables, CEO 
Optimism and Cash Flow, because they provide the clearest indication of results that are 
consistent with expectations from prior literature. We find that optimistic CEOs are significantly 
more likely to overinvest and that the overinvesting will lead to declining ROA in the future. 
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Similarly, we find that firms with more cash flow are significantly more likely to overinvest; 
these firms are also significantly more likely to overinvest and experience declining ROA. 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
As I discuss in the next section under limitations, one of the important factors in our empirical 
analysis of foresight in this paper is the performance window. The main results examine the 
difference in performance between times t and t+3, because foresight will typically precede rent 
generation (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 2005). While three years may be appropriate for some types of 
capital investments, different performance horizons may impact our analysis of managerial 
foresight. This section provides a robustness check by presenting results from a two-year 
horizon, i.e., where above-normal returns are measured in t+2 after the investment decision. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 About Here 
--------------------------------------- 
 Table 9 presents the results analogous to Panel B and Panel C of Table 2. Here, the 
sample size for data in t+2 if 59,980 firm-year observations, meaning that we increase the sample 
size by 5,407 observations by decreasing the performance window. Panel A of Table 9 shows 
that 23.7% of firms are underinvesting, 50.8% of firms invest at the benchmark, and 25.5% of 
firms are overinvesting. These results for the t+2 sample are nearly identical to those from the 
t+3 sample. Panel B of Table 9 also shows that the t+2 sample is very similar to that from t+3. 
The main difference, as expected because we are working with a shorter performance horizon, is 
that the t+2 sample contains fewer firms that exit. These similar results suggest that modifying 
the performance horizon by a single year should not significantly alter the managerial and firm-
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level characteristics that are associated with foresight. In untabulated results, we further show 
that the tenor of the relationship between underinvesting and overinvesting and the 
characteristics variables also remains the same within the t+2 sample. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The main objectives of this paper are to define a theory of managerial foresight and to introduce 
a new measure that captures foresight. We also highlight the characteristics of managers and 
firms that appear to exhibit foresight. 
 We say that managers exhibit foresight when they make unique investment decisions 
today that deliver above-normal returns in the future. The context of our analysis is the level of 
firm investment, where unique investments deviate from the expected investment level of the 
external capital market. We define underinvestment as investing less than an expected level, 
while overinvestment is investing more, and we estimate these expected levels using a market-
model. By utilizing their proprietary information within imperfect strategic factor markets, some 
managers will deliver above-normal returns, either by underinvesting or overinvesting. 
 Within our full sample, we find that approximately 22.4% of underinvesting firms exhibit 
foresight and 25.0% of overinvesting firms exhibit foresight. Overall, about 8.4% of firms are 
considered to be investing with foresight: about 3.8% of firms underinvest with foresight and 
4.6% of firms overinvest with foresight. We also use one-way analysis of variance tests to 
examine the managerial and firm-level characteristics of investment deviation (i.e., 
underinvestment and overinvestment) and managerial foresight. We present evidence that the 
performance of overinvesting firms may actually be higher, on average, than that of a benchmark 
category, and that the performance of underinvesting firms is not significantly worse. We also 
104 
show that overinvesting firms tend to have more optimistic CEOs, who appear to face weaker 
governance controls on their board of directors. Further, both overinvesting in general and 
overinvesting with no foresight are strongly associated with cash flow. 
 
7.1 Limitations 
While the preliminary results in this paper suggest one potential theory and empirical 
examination of managerial foresight, several limitations of the analysis are important to 
recognize. 
 As mentioned in the discussion of this paper’s setting, luck almost certainly plays some 
role in the ability of firms to exhibit above-normal returns. This paper makes no attempt to 
distinguish between luck and foresight, although we recognize that it is an important limitation to 
drawing conclusions about managerial foresight. 
 Even absent luck, the measurement of managerial foresight must confront several 
limitations related to measurement concerns. By estimating an investment expectation model 
using residual analysis, we are essentially assuming that the average deviation from expected 
investment across industry-years is equal to zero. In this case, the definition of industry 
classifications, a problem faced in many research settings, is a particularly important aspect of 
the expectations model. Further, the explanatory variable in our market-based model of 
expectations is the firm’s market-to-book ratio, which is also subject to mismeasurement. The 
MTB ratio is a measurement, at best, of the firm’s average set of investment opportunities. For 
our purposes, though, the ratio delivers something of an advantage, in that it is the precisely 
market’s expectations of growth that we want to measure.  
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 An important aspect of the empirical approach in this paper is the use of industry-
adjusted ROA as the measure for above-normal returns. Recall that firms must exhibit positive 
and increasing ROA to be classified as having foresight. An alternative measure of performance 
might be the firm’s cumulative abnormal returns based on stock price. Assuming a semi-strong 
efficiency of the stock market implies that these returns should reflect all publicly available 
information about the performance prospects of the firm. One aspect of this information is of 
course the firm’s level of investment, as well as its deviation from market expectations. We opt 
for ROA in our preliminary analysis because it most closely captures the effectiveness of the 
investment decision alone. While ROA can be subject to earnings and asset management 
practices, these types of manipulations would also likely impact market value. Further, if 
managers use foresight to appropriate rents for themselves, as they appear to do in Ahuja et al. 
(2005), the stock price of the firm may actually be depressed as a consequence of greater 
managerial foresight (Castanias and Helfat 1992; Coff 1999). 
 Determining the window to evaluate above-normal returns (whether using industry-
adjusted ROA or cumulative abnormal stock returns) is also a complicating factor of the analysis 
in this paper. We opt for measuring the change in industry-adjusted ROA from year t to t+3, 
because it likely takes at least a few years for rents to accrue from the capital expenditures 
studied in this analysis. In a robustness check detailed in the previous section, we demonstrate 
that shortening the performance window by one year does not appear to affect the empirical 
conclusions in this paper. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for various samples in this paper. The Full Sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2006 that are used to 
compute the first-stage regression estimates of industry-year levels of investment. The t+3 Sample consists of firms for which we have 
ROA information in t+3; some firms “exit” the sample because they are no longer listed in Compustat, either for positive or negative 
reasons. Sample summary statistics are also provided for individual years (1996 and 2006) and for the retail industry (Fama-French 
industry 42) in those years. 
 
 
Full Sample t+3 Sample t  = 1996 t  = 2006 Retail (1996) Retail (2006)
Observations 75163 54573 6758 6769 355 271
Mean 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std Dev 0.666 0.667 0.231 0.247 0.292 0.049
Percentiles
1% -0.315 -0.317 -0.280 -0.374 -0.280 -0.091
10% -0.078 -0.075 -0.110 -0.074 -0.083 -0.049
25% -0.040 -0.038 -0.053 -0.035 -0.041 -0.035
50% -0.017 -0.015 -0.022 -0.011 -0.018 -0.006
75% 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.008 0.022 0.022
90% 0.075 0.089 0.077 0.064 0.074 0.061
99% 0.548 0.617 0.700 0.541 0.208 0.153  
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Table 2: Basic descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Full data sample used to calculate investment deviation levels based on industry-year 
regressions of firm-level investment on the firm’s market-to-book ratio. Firms in the bottom 
(top) quartile are classified as underinvesting (overinvesting). Firms in the middle two quartiles 
are the benchmark, considered to be investing according to market expectations. 
 
Obs %
Underinvesting 18798 25.0
Benchmark 37581 50.0
Overinvesting 18784 25.0
Total 75163 100.0  
 
 
 
Panel B: Data sample for firms that contain ROA data in t+3 in order to calculate whether firm-
level industry-adjusted ROA increases or decreases 
 
Obs %
Underinvesting 12820 23.5
Benchmark 27793 50.9
Overinvesting 13960 25.6
Total 54573 100.0  
 
 
Panel C: Data sample breakdown based on underinvesting/overinvesting and whether the firm 
exhibits foresight from time t to t+3 
 
Obs %
Underinvesting
No Foresight 9943 13.2
Foresight 2877 3.8
Exit 5978 8.0
Benchmark 27793 37.0
Exit 9788 13.0
Overinvesting
No Foresight 10469 13.9
Foresight 3491 4.6
Exit 4824 6.4
Total 75163 100.0  
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Table 3: One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test. Compares the sample means of the residual 
across the three main categories of underinvesting, benchmark, and overinvesting. Significantly different sample means are 
highlighted in bold. 
 
 
Deviation from Expected Investment (Residual)
Obs Mean Std Dev Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting
x
Underinvesting 18798 -0.13 0.76 x
0.112 x
Benchmark 37581 -0.02 0.02 0.000 x
0.292 0.180 x
Overinvesting 18784 0.16 1.08 0.000 0.000 x
Total 75163 0.00 0.67  
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Table 4: One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for mean 
ROA change between year t and t+3 across the underinvesting, benchmark, and overinvesting 
groups. Significant differences in sample means are highlighted in bold.  
 
Panel A: Full sample of 54,573 firm-year observations 
 
Change in industry-adjusted ROA between t  and t+3
Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting
Underinvesting x
x
Benchmark -0.023 x
1.000 x
Overinvesting 0.314 0.338 x
0.129 0.031 x  
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Table 5: Summary statistics for investment deviation from benchmark within the smaller characteristics sample 
 
Panel A: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in each group 
 
Obs %
Underinvesting 827 16.1
Benchmark 3012 58.8
Overinvesting 1286 25.1
Total 5125 100.0  
 
 
 
Panel B: Mean and standard deviations for characteristics of each group 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Underinvesting 55.54 7.82 8.34 7.75 0.41 0.49 0.66 0.17 0.41 0.49 0.11 0.11
Benchmark 55.21 7.52 7.92 7.79 0.38 0.49 0.67 0.17 0.34 0.47 0.09 0.10
Overinvesting 55.42 7.66 8.78 8.31 0.51 0.50 0.65 0.18 0.25 0.43 0.15 0.11
Total 55.31 7.61 8.20 7.92 0.42 0.49 0.66 0.17 0.33 0.47 0.11 0.11
CEO TenureCEO Age Multi. Firm Cash FlowCEO Optimism % Indep. Dirs.
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Table 6: Summary statistics for investment foresight within the smaller characteristics sample 
 
Panel A: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in each group 
 
Obs %
Underinvesting
No Foresight 548 10.7
Foresight 279 5.4
Benchmark 3012 58.8
Overinvesting
No Foresight 884 17.2
Foresight 402 7.8
Total 5125 100.0  
 
 
Panel B: Mean and standard deviations for characteristics of each group 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Underinvesting 55.42 7.57 10.01 8.31 0.37 0.48 0.60 0.17 0.43 0.50
with Declining ROA
Underinvesting 55.30 7.18 7.88 5.73 0.39 0.49 0.64 0.17 0.39 0.49
with Increasing ROA
Benchmark 55.48 7.40 8.13 7.71 0.37 0.48 0.68 0.17 0.34 0.47 0.10 0.10
Overinvesting 55.51 7.84 9.34 8.48 0.57 0.50 0.63 0.18 0.24 0.42
with Declining ROA
Overinvesting 54.12 7.40 8.30 7.21 0.47 0.50 0.61 0.18 0.28 0.45
with Increasing ROA
Total 55.39 7.45 8.33 7.73 0.40 0.49 0.66 0.17 0.33 0.47 0.11 0.11
CEO Age CEO Tenure CEO Optimism % Indep. Dirs.
0.11 0.11
0.17 0.14
0.09 0.10
Multi. Firm Cash Flow
0.13 0.11
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Table 7: Multinomial logit model of underinvesting and overinvesting 
 
 
Benchmark Group:
Underinvesting Overinvesting
[1] [2]
CEO Optimism 0.091 0.348***
(0.188) (0.132)
Cash Flow -0.218 4.008***
(0.886) (0.923)
CEO is not Chair (0,1) -0.761*** -0.140
(0.210) (0.144)
Independent Directors (%) -1.940*** -1.519***
(0.439) (0.384)
CEO Tenure (log) 0.056 0.013
(0.087) (0.067)
CEO Long-term Incentives (%) 0.053 0.165
(0.318) (0.226)
Guidance (0,1) -0.543*** 0.023
(0.153) (0.121)
No. Segments 0.021 -0.098*
(0.057) (0.056)
Total Assets (log) 0.125* -0.007
(0.072) (0.051)
Constant -2.015** -1.191*
(0.944) (0.703)
Observations 3,765 3,765
Pseudo R-squared 0.0482 0.0482
Log likelihood -2531 -2531
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Baseline Investment
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Table 8: Multinomial logit model of underinvesting and overinvesting with sub-groups for ROA performance in t+3 
 
 
Benchmark Group:
Underinvesting Underinvesting Overinvesting Overinvesting
ROA Declines ROA Increases ROA Declines ROA Increases
[1] [2] [3] [4]
CEO Optimism -0.151 0.286 0.385*** 0.268
(0.229) (0.228) (0.148) (0.195)
Cash Flow 2.852* -2.052*** 6.055*** 0.751
(1.483) (0.722) (1.095) (0.979)
CEO is not Chair (0,1) -0.673** -0.834*** -0.291* 0.082
(0.269) (0.287) (0.174) (0.189)
Independent Directors (%) -2.449*** -1.324** -1.187*** -2.022***
(0.510) (0.554) (0.426) (0.549)
CEO Tenure (log) 0.125 -0.008 0.029 -0.002
(0.113) (0.111) (0.079) (0.092)
CEO Long-term Incentives (%) 0.126 -0.018 0.100 0.219
(0.410) (0.378) (0.254) (0.346)
Guidance (0,1) -0.246 -0.826*** 0.124 -0.122
(0.207) (0.201) (0.136) (0.180)
No. Segments 0.059 -0.016 -0.080 -0.119
(0.065) (0.081) (0.064) (0.080)
Total Assets (log) 0.032 0.219** -0.009 0.010
(0.084) (0.092) (0.056) (0.070)
Constant -2.727** -2.974** -2.329*** -1.394
(1.222) (1.233) (0.840) (0.908)
Observations 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765
Pseudo R-squared 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524
Log likelihood -3098 -3098 -3098 -3098
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Baseline Investment
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Table 9: Basic descriptive statistics for performance window t+2 
 
 
Panel A: Data sample for firms that contain ROA data in t+2 in order to calculate whether firm-
level industry-adjusted ROA increases or decreases 
 
Obs %
Underinvesting 14209 23.7
Benchmark 30473 50.8
Overinvesting 15298 25.5
Total 59980 100.0  
 
 
Panel C: Data sample breakdown based on underinvesting/overinvesting and whether the firm 
exhibits foresight from time t to t+2 
 
Obs %
Underinvesting
No Foresight 11171 14.9
Foresight 3038 4.0
Exit 4589 6.1
Benchmark 30473 40.5
Exit 7108 9.5
Overinvesting
No Foresight 11426 15.2
Foresight 3872 5.2
Exit 3486 4.6
Total 75163 100.0  
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Figure 1: Histograms of residuals for various samples. 
 
 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Investment Residual (Deviation from Expected)
Histogram of Residuals for Retail Industry (t = 2006)
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Investment Residual (Deviation from Expected)
Histogram of Residuals for Retail Industry (t = 1996)
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
2
0
0
0
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Investment Residual (Deviation from Expected)
Histogram of Residuals (t = 2006)
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
-.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Investment Residual (Deviation from Expected)
Histogram of Residuals (t = 1996)
118 
Figure 2: Median firm-level ROA for firms in categories based on whether they underinvest and 
overinvest relative to a benchmark, and whether the firm survives to period t+3 in the analysis or 
exits the sample. 
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Figure 3: Median ROA at times t and t+3, for the groups underinvesting, benchmark, and 
overinvesting. 
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Figure 4: Median ROA at times t and t+3, for the groups underinvesting, benchmark, and 
overinvesting, also split out based on foresight: Under/No=Underinvesting with no foresight; 
Under/Yes=Underinvesting with foresight; Benchmark=Investing according to market 
expectations; Over/No=Overinvesting with no foresight; Over/Yes=Overinvesting with 
foresight. 
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Appendix A: A Short Analysis of the Retail Industry in 1996 
In order to provide some context to the measure of foresight developed in this paper, we explore 
some of the firms from in sample from the retail industry (Fama-French industry 42) starting in 
1996. Note that this analysis is preliminary and is only meant at this stage to suggest the type of 
investigation that can be carried out using our approach to managerial foresight. Summary 
statistics for the retail industry in 1996 are presented in Table 1, and a histogram of the residuals 
for this industry-year is depicted in Figure 1. 
 One example of a firm that overinvested with foresight in 1996 was Costco Wholesale. 
Following on the heels of its unsuccessful merger with PriceClub, Costco began a rapid period of 
expansion through the U.S. and the world. At the close of 2005 (the beginning period of the 
analysis in this paper), Costco traded for $15.25 per share. According to our analysis, Costco 
overinvested with foresight during both 2006 and 2007, when its capital expenditures were $507 
million and $553 million. By the end of period t+3 in 1998, the stock price had climbed to 
$72.19. It was $91.25 at the end of 1999. 
 Our analysis next suggests that Costco continued to overinvest but with no foresight 
during the four years from 1999 to 2002. By the end of 2002, three years after the first year of 
overinvesting with no foresight, the stock price had fallen to $56.12 (note that price is adjusted 
for a 2:1 split in January 2000). From there, the stock did begin to climb again, reaching $74.36 
by 2003, $96.82 by 2004, and $98.94 by 2005, but it was only just returning to the highs 
originally reached at the end of 1999. 
 Rite-Aid represents a firm in our sample that overinvested with no foresight in 1996. Its 
stock price closed 1995 at $31.56 and hit $97.14 (adjusted for 2:1 split in February 1998) by the 
end of 1998. These gains were illusory, though. By 2002, the Chairman/CEO and other senior 
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executives were indicted (and later found guilty) of fraud.68 The overinvestment in expansion 
carried out by Rite-Aid required accounting fraud to prop up the firm. It was forced to restate its 
earnings over this period by $1.6 billion, the most-ever for a public company at that time. Its 
stock plunged in March 1999 and has never fully recovered.69  
 Some of the retail firms that made corporate investments in line with market expectations 
during this period include Albertson’s, Safeway, Wal-Mart, Walgreen, Dollar General Corp, and 
Family Dollar Stores.  
 Intimate Brands, spun off from The Limited, Inc., in 1995, underinvested with foresight 
in 1996. The company consisted primarily of the Victoria’s Secret catalog and stores and Bath & 
Body Works stores. By the end of 1999 (t+3 following the underinvestment with foresight), the 
stock price had climbed from $14.75 (prior to the underinvestment) to $30.38. Intimate Brands 
was re-integrated into The Limited as Limited Brands in 2002.70 
 
 
                                                 
68 http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-06-22/business/0206220004_1_rite-aid-grass-aid-corp 
69 http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-03-19/business/9903190179_1_rite-aid-aid-corp-ziegler 
70 http://www.limitedbrands.com/our_company/about_us/timeline.aspx 
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Appendix B: One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for sample means across groups 
 
CEO Age CEO Tenure
Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting
Underinvesting x Underinvesting x
x x
Benchmark -0.337 x Benchmark -0.420 x
0.779 x 0.529 x
Overinvesting -0.118 0.219 x Overinvesting 0.436 0.856 x
1.000 1.000 x 0.650 0.004 x
CEO Optimism % Independent Directors
Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting
Underinvesting x Underinvesting x
x x
Benchmark -0.029 x Benchmark 0.012 x
0.450 x 0.237 x
Overinvesting 0.102 0.131 x Overinvesting -0.008 -0.020 x
0.000 0.000 x 0.972 0.002 x
Multisegment Firm Cash Flow
Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting
Underinvesting x Underinvesting x
x x
Benchmark -0.029 x Benchmark -0.024 x
0.336 x 0.000 x
Overinvesting -0.078 -0.049 x Overinvesting 0.032 0.055 x
0.001 0.005 x 0.000 0.000 x  
 
124 
Appendix C: One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for sample means across groups  
 
CEO Age
Underinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Overinvesting
ROA Declines ROA Increases ROA Declines ROA Increases
Underinvesting x
ROA Declines x
Underinvesting -0.115 x
ROA Increases 1.000 x
Benchmark 0.065 0.180 x
1.000 1.000 x
Overinvesting 0.094 0.209 0.029 x
ROA Declines 1.000 1.000 1.000 x
Overinvesting -1.296 -1.180 -1.360 -1.390 x
ROA Increases 1.000 1.000 0.087 0.272 x
CEO Tenure
Underinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Overinvesting
ROA Declines ROA Increases ROA Declines ROA Increases
Underinvesting x
ROA Declines x
Underinvesting -2.135 x
ROA Increases 0.171 x
Benchmark -1.880 0.255 x
0.040 1.000 x
Overinvesting -0.673 1.462 1.207 x
ROA Declines 1.000 0.485 0.039 x
Overinvesting -1.715 0.420 0.165 -1.042 x
ROA Increases 0.361 1.000 1.000 1.000 x  
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Appendix C (cont’d): One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for sample means across groups 
 
CEO Optimism
Underinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Overinvesting
ROA Declines ROA Increases ROA Declines ROA Increases
Underinvesting x
ROA Declines x
Underinvesting 0.023 x
ROA Increases 1.000 x
Benchmark 0.005 -0.019 x
1.000 1.000 x
Overinvesting 0.199 0.175 0.194 x
ROA Declines 0.000 0.002 0.000 x
Overinvesting 0.102 0.078 0.097 -0.097 x
ROA Increases 0.484 1.000 0.039 0.173 x
% Independent Directors
Underinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Overinvesting
ROA Declines ROA Increases ROA Declines ROA Increases
Underinvesting x
ROA Declines x
Underinvesting 0.044 x
ROA Increases 0.274 x
Benchmark 0.079 0.036 x
0.000 0.129 x
Overinvesting 0.037 -0.007 -0.042 x
ROA Declines 0.254 1.000 0.000 x
Overinvesting 0.012 -0.032 -0.068 -0.025 x
ROA Increases 1.000 0.751 0.000 0.768 x  
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Appendix C (cont’d): One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for sample means across groups 
 
Multisegment Firm
Underinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Overinvesting
ROA Declines ROA Increases ROA Declines ROA Increases
Underinvesting x
ROA Declines x
Underinvesting -0.038 x
ROA Increases 1.000 x
Benchmark -0.087 -0.049 x
0.280 1.000 x
Overinvesting -0.193 -0.156 -0.106 x
ROA Declines 0.000 0.006 0.000 x
Overinvesting -0.150 -0.112 -0.063 0.044 x
ROA Increases 0.026 0.233 0.540 1.000 x
Cash Flow
Underinvesting Underinvesting Benchmark Overinvesting Overinvesting
ROA Declines ROA Increases Benchmark ROA Declines ROA Increases
Underinvesting x
ROA Declines x
Underinvesting -0.041 x
ROA Increases 0.008 x
Benchmark -0.025 0.016 x
0.057 0.628 x
Overinvesting 0.041 0.082 0.066 x
ROA Declines 0.000 0.000 0.000 x
Overinvesting -0.015 0.026 0.009 -0.057 x
ROA Increases 1.000 0.203 1.000 0.000 x  
 
